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ARTICLES

The Economic Efficiency of the Robust

Rules of Modern Product Liability Law
Ronald Sisselman* and David R. Wade** t
I.

INTRODUCTION

The rules of liability assignment in product claims have changed
significantly since the 1960s. Courts have embraced rules imposing
"strict liability" on manufacturers while eschewing traditional negligence rules.' Policy justifications for this shift have included risk
* Senior Lecturer in Business and the Management Center, Aurora University,
Aurora, Illinois; B.S. SUNY - Cortland; B.B.A. Hofstra University; M.B.A. University of Chicago; Ph.D. University of Illinois - Chicago.
** Assistant Professor, Northern Illinois University, DeKalb, Illinois; B.A. Grinnell
College; M.A. Duquesne University; J.D. University of Iowa College of Law.
t The authors would like to thank Shane Osowski for his thoughtful research
assistance and helpful comments on earlier drafts.
1. Strict liability was first adopted in California in the now classic case of
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963). In 1964, the
American Law Institute drafted and in 1965 adopted § 402A of the Second Restatement of Torts. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). A majority of
jurisdictions were quick to adopt 402A by judicial decision. See, e.g., Atkins v.
American Motors Corp., 335 So. 2d 134 (Ala. 1976); O.S. Stapley Co. v. Miller, 447
P.2d 248 (Ariz. 1968); Bradford v. Bendix-Westinghouse Auto. Air Brake Co., 517
P.2d 406 (Colo. 1973); Wachtel v. Rosol, 271 A.2d 84 (Conn. 1970); West v.
Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1976); Stewart v. Budget Rent-A-Car
Corp., 470 P.2d 240 (Haw. 1970); Shields v. Morton Chem. Co., 518 P.2d 857
(Idaho 1974); Perfection Paint & Color Co. v. Konduris, 258 N.E.2d 681 (Ind. 1970);
Hawkeye-Sec. Ins. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 174 N.W.2d 672 (Iowa 1970); Brooks v.
Dietz, 545 P.2d 1104 (Kan. 1976); Dealers Transp. Co. v. Battery Distrib. Co., 402
S.W.2d 441 (Ky. 1965); Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 363 A.2d 955 (Md. 1976);
State Stove Mfg. Co. v. Hodges, 189 So. 2d 113 (Miss. 1966); Keener v. Dayton
Elec. Mfg. Co., 445 S.W.2d 362 (Mo. 1969); Brandenburger v. Toyota Motor Sales,
513 P.2d 268 (Mont. 1973); Buttrick v. Arthur Lessard & Sons, 260 A.2d 111 (N.H.
1969); Stang v. Hertz Corp., 497 P.2d 732 (N.M. 1972); Robinson v. Reed-Prentice
Div. of Package Mach. Co., 403 N.E.2d 440 (N.Y. 1980); Johnson v. American
Motors Corp., 225 N.W.2d 57 (N.D. 1974); Kirkland v. General Motors Corp., 521
P.2d 1353 (Okla. 1974); Heaton v. Ford Motor Co., 435 P.2d 806 (Or. 1967); Webb
v. Zern, 220 A.2d 853 (Pa. 1966); Ritter v. Narragansett Elec. Co., 283 A.2d 255
(R.I. 1971); Enberg v. Ford Motor Co., 205 N.W.2d 104 (S.D. 1973); Darryl v. Ford
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spreading and deterrence 2 as well as a "deep pockets" rationale.'
This change has been costly to American industry which has
faced significantly increased levels of litigation, 4 liability for a broader
Motor Co., 440 S.W.2d 630 (Tex. 1969); Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. Armco Steel Co.,
601 P.2d 152 (Utah 1979); Zaleskie v. Joyce, 333 A.2d 110 (Vt. 1975); Ulmer v. Ford
Motor Co., 452 P.2d 729 (Wash. 1969); Dipple v. Sciano, 155 N.W.2d 55 (Wis.
1967); Ogle v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 716 P.2d 334 (Wyo. 1986).
Other jurisdictions have enacted statutes adopting 402A. See, e.g., ARK. CODE.
ANN. § 4-86-102 (Michie 1987); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 221 (West 1964).
Still others have judicially adopted strict liability in product claims according to a
rule essentially similar to 402A. See, e.g., Bachner v. Pearson, 479 P.2d 319 (Alaska
1970); Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897' (Cal. 1963); Martin v.
Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 353 A.2d 581 (Del. 1976); Suvada v. White Motor Co.,
210 N.E.2d 182 (Ill. 1965); Weber v. Fidelity & Cas. Ins. Co., 250 So. 2d 754 (La.
1971); Piercefield v. Remington Arms Co., 133 N.W.2d 129 (Mich. 1965); Kerr v.
Corning Glass Works, 169 N.W.2d 587 (Minn. 1969); Kohler v. Ford Motor Co.,
191 N.W.2d 601 (Neb. 1971); Ginnis v. Mapes Hotel Corp., 470 P.2d 135 (Nev.
1970); Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 207 A.2d 305 (N.J. 1965); Lonzrick v.
Republic Steel Corp., 218 N.E.2d 185 (Ohio 1966); Ford Motor Co. v. Lonon, 398
S.W.2d 240 (Tenn. 1966); Morningstar v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 253 S.E.2d 666
(W. Va. 1979). Four states have refused to adopt strict liability, preferring instead to
rely on warranty theories. For the most part, a breach of implied warranty cause of
action parrots a strict liability theory. See, e.g., Mason v. General Motors Corp.,
490 N.E.2d 437 (Mass. 1986); MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 106, §§ 2-314 to -318
(West 1990); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 25-2-314 to -318 (1990); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 36-2314 to -318 (Law. Co-op. 1976); VA. CODE §§ 8.2-314 to -318 (Michie 1950).
2. See John W. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44

Miss. L.J. 825 (1973). Professor Wade offers the following public policy reasons to
support the adoption of strict liability: 1) the plaintiff was relieved of the difficulty of
proving the manufacturer's negligence, 2) the cost of the injury was spread out over the
consuming public instead of falling on one person, and 3) the potential imposition of
strict liability would deter manufacturers from creating unsafe products. Id. at 826.
Other commentators have criticized these reasons. See, e.g., David G. Owen, Rethinking
the Policies of Strict ProductsLiability, 33 VAND. L. REv. 681, 703-714 (1980).

3. See Nancy DuBois Wright, Hoelter-Skelter: Product Defect and Plaintiff
Negligence - A Connecticut Commentary on Confusion, 10 CONN. L. REV. 90, 117

(1977) (offering the view that businesses can estimate risks, plan for them and treat
them as a business cost and are thus better able to absorb accident costs). But cf
Marcus L. Plant, Comparative Negligence and Strict Tort Liability, 40 LA. L. REV.
403, 416 (1980) (finding large but not small businesses able to sustain such costs).
4. An examination of suits filed in federal district courts reveals that the
number of suits has increased by 758% from 1,579 to 13,554 during the period 19741985. See ALLIANCE OF AMERICAN INSURERS ET. AL., PROPERTY AND CASUALTY

INSURANCE INDUSTRY DATA AND THE CASE FOR TORT REFORM: DOCUMENTING THE
CosT OF EXPANDING TORT LIABILITY DOCTRINES BEYOND TRADITIONAL COMMON LAW
BOUNDARIES 35 (1986) [hereinafter AAI REFORM DATA]. But cf UNITED STATES
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,

GAO/HRD-88-36BR,

PRODUCT LIABILITY: EXTENT OF
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6
range of injuries5 and higher damage awards. In response, industry has
7 counseling either a return to
pursued efforts at significant tort reform,
classical negligence rules or the adoption of a uniform federal products
liability statute.' More specifically, they argue that strict liability is both2
0
innovation
unjust 9 and inefficient; that it has increased costs," stifled
and made it increasingly more difficult for American manufacturers to
3
vie with foreign competitors. A fierce debate has ensued.
4
Legal scholars have joined the debate. 1 Much of this scholarship

IN FEDERAL COURTS QUESTIONED (1988) (The GAO, while
conceding that litigation of product claims has increased significantly, finds that the
increase is deceptive because it is primarily a result of increased litigation of asbestos,
Dalkon shield and bendictin cases.).
5. AAI REFORM DATA, supra note 4, at 6.
6. AAI REFORM DATA, supra note 4, at 38-39; see also JAMES S. KAKALK &
"LITIGATION EXPLOSION"

NICHOLAS M. PACE, COSTS AND COMPENSATION PAID IN TORT LITIGATION
7.

See AMERICAN

(1986).

INSURANCE ASSOCIATION, AMERICAN INSURANCE ASSOCIATION

PRODUCTS LIABILITY STATEMENT

(1986) (Statement by Richard A. Epstein to the

California Citizen's Commission on Tort Reform on behalf of the American Insurance
Association); Ted Gest, Economic Outlook: Limiting the Damage from Liability
Suits, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., May 15, 1989, at 50; Whitt Flora, The Product
Liability Battle Moves to Capitol Hill, IRON AGE, June 6, 1986, at 46.
8. See, e.g., H. R. 1115, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1987) (proposed Uniform
Product Safety Act of 1987); S. 1400, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1989) (propsed Product
Liability Reform Act).
9. See generally Malott, Let's Restore Balance to Product Liability Law,
HARv. Bus. REV., May-June 1983, at 67.
10. See generally RESEARCH AND POLICY COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE FOR ECONOMIC
WITH RISK
DEVELOPMENT, WHO SHOULD BE LIABLE: A GUIDE TO POLICY FOR DEALING
(1989) (arguing that the duplicating systems of compensation result in inefficiency).
11. Id. at 37-39; Bush Targets Product Liability for Overhaul, CHI. TRIB., Nov.
16, 1989, § C, at 7.
12. See Lawsuits Deterring Medical R & D, THE REFORMER, Jan.-Feb. 1989, at 1;
Richard J. Mahoney, It's Time to Curb the Courts, N.Y. Tams, Dec. 11, 1988, § 3, at
3; Robert E. Litan et al., The U.S. Liability System: Background and Trends, in
LIABILYrr PERSPECTIVES AND POLICY 1, 1 (Robert E. Litan & Clifford Winston eds.,
1988); Peter Huber, Who Will Protect Us From Our Protectors, FORBES, July 13, 1987,
at 56.
13. See generally Huber, supra note 12; Letter from Senators John C. Danforth
& Robert W. Kasten Jr. to colleagues in the U.S. Senate (May 16, 1989) (on file with
author); American International Group, Why Reforming Our Liabiulity System is
Essential if America is to Succeed in Overseas Markets, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 11, 1991,
at 11 (advertisement).
14. Much of this scholarship has focused on the question of causation. This
article does not directly address the issue of causation except insofar as discussions
of economic efficiency are inherent to both. For a complete discussion of economic
theory applied to the concept of proximate cause, see generally Mark F. Grady,
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utilizes economic models to analyze legal rules. 5 Legal rules assign
liability for the costs of accidents to the accidents' parties and thus
are assumed to provide incentives to those parties to take levels of
precaution which affect the total social cost of the accidents. Some
analysts conclude the tort system has abandoned efficient rules 16 and
has adopted inefficient ones.' Other analysts conclude that the rules
of tort law are efficient.' 8 Regardless of the conclusions reached, the
conventional economic analysis is incomplete and has inadvertently
misinformed the debate.
The general aim of this article is to show first that a set of
efficient rules has been adopted by our tort system and second that
the efficient rules adopted are not the rules which have been the
Proximate Cause and the Law of Negligence, 69 IA. L. REV. 363 (1984); William M.
Landes & Richard A. Posner, Causation in Tort Law: An Economic Approach, 12
J. LEGAL. STUD. 109 (1983); Steven Shavell, An Analysis of Causation and the Scope
of Liability in the Law of Torts, 9 J. LEGAL. STUD. 463 (1980); Mario J. Rizzo &
Frank S. Arnold, Causal Apportionment in the Law of Torts: An Economic Theory,
80 COLUM. L. REV. 1399 (1980).

15. See generally John Prather Brown, Toward an Economic Theory of Liability, 2 J. LEGAL. STUD. 323 (1973); ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND
ECONOMICS (1988); RIcHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (3d ed. 1986);

William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, A Positive Economic Analysis of Products
Liability, 14 J. LEGAL. STUD. 535 (1985).

16. Efficiency, when used in this context, means to "minimize the sum of
accident costs and the costs of accident avoidance." See Guido Calabresi & John T.
Hirshoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055, 1057 (1972).
Efficient rules provide incentives to the parties to take safety precautions that
minimize the cost of accidents to society. Inefficient rules do not provide such
incentives and social costs are not minimized. But cf. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, A THEORY
OF STRICT LIABILITY: TOWARD A REFORMULATION OF TORT LAW 4 (1980) (Epstein
"does not regard economic theory as the primary means to establish the rules of
legal responsibility.").
17. See generally Steven Shavell, Strict Liability versus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL.
STUD. 1 (1980). Shavell maintains that the conventional analysis, by inappropriately
failing to consider levels of activity, incorrectly determines that a rule is efficient
when in fact it is not. Cf. COOTER & ULEN, supra note 15, at 436. Cooter and Ulen
generally conclude the rules themselves are efficient but are utilized inappropriately
by the judiciary, leading to the failure of an otherwise efficient rule to provide the
incentives necessary to achieve minimal accident costs.
18. See generally Landes & Posner, supra note 15. See also John C. Goodman,
An Economic Theory of the Evolution of the Common Law, 7 J. LEGAL. STUD. 393
(1978); George L. Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient
Rules, 6 J. LEGAL. STUD. 65 (1977); Paul H. Rubin, Why is the Common Law
Efficient?, 6 J. LEGAL. STUD. 51 (1977); Brown, supra note 15; FRIEDRICH. A.
HAYEK,

3

LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY

ANALYSIS OF LAW

(2d ed. 1977).

(1979);

RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC

1991:1]

ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY

subject of the debate. More specifically, legal scholars have erred in
three ways. First, they have focused on an inappropriate and narrow
set of "simple rules." ' 9 In Part II, we will derive a mutually-exclusive
and exhaustive set of simple rules by partitioning the "accident event
space." 20 We will determine the efficiency of each member of the set
while eliminating the inefficient rules, 2' arriving at a complete set of
efficient simple rules. 22 Second, scholars have assumed that simple
rules deemed efficient within the parameters of their economic model
will also be efficient in application. In Part III, we will explore this
assumption and demonstrate it to be false.23 Third, scholars have
incorrectly assumed that courts adopt simple rules and that courts'
notion of strict liability is the same as the notion of strict liability
adopted in the academic literature. In Part IV, we will provide an
alternative set of "robust rules ' 24 which more accurately explain the
courts' notion of strict liability and the seemingly capricious assign25
ment of liability under modern negligence doctrine.

II.

THE FORMAL

DERIVATION OF A COMPLETE SET OF SIMPLE RULES
OF LIABILITY ASSIGNMENT

2
Accidents are conceived of as involving "victims" and "injurers."
The "socially-optimal level of precaution ' 27 exercisable by a potential

19. The term "simple rules" is one adopted by the authors for the purposes of
clarity, providing a term which can easily be distinguished from the "robust rules"
introduced later. See generally infra part IV (discussing robust rules in detail). We
will later demonstrate that these simple rules are both confusing and inefficient. See
generally infra part III.
20. See infra Table 1, part II. Some of these rules, as well as the concept of
an accident event space, have been the subject of evaluation and debate in the existing
literature. See CoomE & ULEN, supra note 15, at 355-59; Brown, supra note 15, at
330-31.
21. See infra Tables 2 & 3, part II. We will utilize the now-familiar Cooter and
Ulen model to determine the efficiency of each member of the set. For a description
of this model, see infra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
22. See infra Table 4, part II. Several of these simple rules have never been
evaluated using an economic model nor considered by economic theorists.
23. The lack of adoption by judicial practitioners makes debate over the
efficiency of simple rules academically fruitful but practically moot. Such rules will
only be efficient under the assumptions of the model used to derive them. Therefore,
while they are efficient in analysis, they will not be efficient in application and would
not be adopted by a tort system concerned with efficiency. For a discussion of the

distinction between efficiency in analysis and application, see generally infra part III.
24. See infra Table 6, part IV(A).
25. Such-robust rules will be those efficient under the model used to derive
them and similarly efficient in application. See generally infra part IV(A).
26. The use of the terms "victim" and "injurer" in the literature implies that
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injurer is defined as X*.28 The socially-optimal level of precaution
exercisable by a potential victim is defined as Y.. 29 Accidents in which
only the potential injurer can take precaution to reduce the probability
of an injury's occurrence or its severity are accidents under "conditions of injurer unilateral precaution." 30 Accidents in which only the
potential victim can take precaution to reduce the probability of an
injury's occurrence or its severity are accidents under "conditions of
victim unilateral precaution." 3' Accidents in which both the injurer
and the victim can take precaution to reduce the probability of an
injury's occurrence or its severity are accidents under "conditions of
bilateral precaution. "32
The set of simple rules for assigning liability under the three sets
of conditions are derived by partitioning the accident event space and
engaging in a two step process.
liability should be automatically thrust upon manufacturers since they are defined as
"injurers." See, e.g., COOTER & ULEN, supra note 15; Brown, supra note 15. While
we will continue the use of the literature's terms, a more appropriate definition might
employ the terms "user" and "manufacturer" since they bestow no a priori assignment of liability upon either actor. We do not consider assignment of liability to
third parties such as Workman's Compensation funds and persons who fail to initiate
a rescue.
27. The socially-optimal level of precaution is the degree of precaution which
minimizes the sum of accident and avoidance costs and thus the total social cost of
accidents. For a complete discussion of economic efficiency related to social costs,
see GuiDo CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
(1970); Ronald N. McKean, Products Liability: Implications of some Changing
Property Rights, 84 Q.J. ECON. 611 (1970); R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social
Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
28. X* is thus the level of precaution taken by an injurer which minimizes total
social costs. Total social costs represent the sum of the costs of accidents and the
costs of accident avoidance. We assume that courts are able to distinguish the sociallyoptimal level of precaution and incorporate it into the legal standard they adopt.
29. Y* is thus the level of precaution taken by a victim which minimizes total
social costs. Total social costs represent the sum of the costs of accidents and the
costs of accident avoidance.
30. An example would be a commercial airline accident. While the manufacturer
and the airline (injurers) can take precaution, passengers (victims) can not. See infra
notes 48, 75-79, 88, 91-92 and accompanying text (discussing injurer unilateral
precaution conditions).
31. An example would be an accident occurring when cutting with a sharp
knife. See Wade, supra note 2, at 844; infra notes 51, 80-87, 89-92 and accompanying
text (discussing victim unilateral precaution conditions).
32. An example would be an automobile accident. The manufacturer may
design a safe braking system and the victim may operate the vehicle safely.

ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY

1991:1]

Y

Y

0

X

X*
FIGURE 1

0

X*

X

FIGURE 2

First, by partitioning the event space, the legal standard or "test
criterion" of the rule is created. While the event space shown in
33
Figure 1 may be partitioned in a number of ways, in that X* and
Y* represent the levels of precaution resulting in the minimum total
social cost, the event space will, when partitioned, be partitioned at

X* and/or

Y*.3 4 Second,

once partitioned, rule derivation is completed

3
by assigning liability for the loss to one of the actors. " For example,
in Figure 2, the event space has been partitioned only at X* and the
right hand shaded section has been designated "the victim." The
statement of liability created is "the victim is liable for his own losses
if the injurer takes a level of precaution equal to or exceeding the
36
socially-optimal level of precaution required by the rule but the

injurer is liable otherwise." In symbolic notation this rule appears as
Vt if: X>X* OTHERWISE IL. 3" Table 1 shows all the possible
3
partitioning schemes and the simple rules derived. "

33. For example, the event space may not be partitioned at all; it may be
partitioned only along the X axis, only along the Y axis or both.
34. See Figure 1. By partitioning at X* and Y* the legal standard conveyed by
provides requirements for both injurers and victims to take their sociallyrule
the
optimal level of precaution.
35. Traditionally, rules have been derived by assigning liability to only one of
the actors. See Brown, supra note 15, at 328. See generally Calabrese & Hirshoff,
supra note 16. This unilateral assignment of liability has resulted in an incomplete
set of simple rules. See generally infra parts II, III. We will discuss the assignment
of liability to both actors and either actor. See generally infra parts II, III, IV.
36. No precaution is required of the victim since no partition was made at Y*.
37. Different analysts utilize various coding schemes to define the various rules
they analyze. See Brown, supra note 15, at 328-31; COOTER & ULEN, supra note 15,
at 354-56. Our coding scheme is utilized for simplicity and defines the rule as follows:
X >X* OTHERWISE IL is the "legal standard" or test criterion section of the rule.
The test criterion defines the level of precaution required of an actor in order for
that actor to avoid liability. VL if: is the assignment of "residual liability". The
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TABLE I
THE COMPLETE SET OF LOGICALLY POSSIBLE SIMPLE RULES
RULE #

LIABILITY
ASSIGNMENT STATEMENT

(1)

VL ALWAYS

(2)

IL ALWAYS

PARTITION
SCHEME

Y*W
X*

VL if: X < X* OTHERWISE IL
IL if: X < X* OTHERWISE VL
VL if: X _>
X* OTHERWISE IL
IL if: X > X* OTHERWISE VL

X*

VL if: Y<Y* OTHERWISE IL

X*

IL if: Y < Y* OTHERWISE VL
VL if: Y > Y* OTHERWISE IL
(10)

X*

IL if: Y > Y* OTHERWISE VL

A-

X*

VICTIM
LIABLE

y.

y. FM

X*

X*
Y*

INJURER
LIABLE

X*

actor named as the bearer of residual liability bears that liability when the actor
named in the test criterion section escapes liability by taking the level of precaution
required by the test criterion. Thus, in the rule VL if: XX* OTHERWISE IL, if
the injurer takes XX* precaution, the injurer escapes liability and the loss falls on
the victim as the bearer of residual liability.
38. While 18 partition schemes exist, the literature, in general, has only given
attention to (1), (2), (5), (10), (14) and (15). See Brown, supra note 15, at 328-31;
COOTER & ULEN, supra note 15, at 354-7 1.
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X*

(11)

VL if: X<X* and Y<Y*
OTHERWISE IL

y*

(12)

IL if: X<X* and Y<Y*
OTHERWISE VL

y*

(13)

VL if: X<X* and Y->Y*
OTHERWISE IL

y*

(14)

IL if: X<X* and Y>Y*
OTHERWISE VL

y*k

(15)

VL if: X_>X* and Y<Y*
OTHERWISE IL

y*

(16)

IL if: X_>X* and Y< Y*
OTHERWISE VL

v*

(17)

VL if: X_>X* and Y>Y*
OTHERWISE IL

y*

(18)

IL if: X_>X* and Y>Y*
OTHERWISE VL

y*

t

x*
x*
x*
x*
x*
x*
x*
x*

Any one of the eighteen rules would be adopted by a tort system.
However, a tort system concerned with efficiency will only consider
efficient rules; that is, those rules from among the eighteen that
provide incentives to the appropriate actors to take their sociallyoptimal level of precaution so as to minimize total social costs.
Therefore, our task is to determine which rules from Table 1 are
efficient.
A. EFFICIENT RULES UNDER CONDITIONS OF BILATERAL
PRECAUTION
The incentive to take the socially-optimal level of precaution and
the resulting attainment of the socially-optimal or minimum level of
accident costs provided by any given rule depends on the particular
situation to which it is applied. 9 We will adopt Professors Cooter
39. Rules may be economically efficient under conditions of bilateral precaution, they may be economically efficient only under conditions of unilateral precaution
or they may not be economically efficient at all. Cooter and Ulen define an efficient
rule as one that provides an incentive to the actors to exercise the socially-optimal
level of care, thereby minimizing the total cost to society. See COOTER & ULEN, supra
note 15, at 340-71 (discussing the determination of the efficiency of a simple rule).
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and Ulens' test to judge the efficiency of a rule under conditions of
bilateral precaution. They find that a rule that assigns one of the
actors residual liability and requires, as a criterion of liability avoidance, that the other actor take the socially-optimal level of precaution
will be economically efficient under conditions of bilateral precaution 40
regardless of any other specification required by the criteria. 4' The
simple rules from Table 1 that meet this test and are efficient under
bilateral precaution conditions are shown in Table 2.
TABLE 2
SIMPLE RULES EFFICIENT UNDER BILATERAL
PRECAUTION CONDITIONS
RULE #
(5)
(10)
(14)
(15)
(17)
(18)

LIABILITY ASSIGNMENT STA TEMENT
VL if: X® X* OTHERWISE IL
IL if: Y® Y* OTHERWISE VL
IL if: X * X* and YO Y* OTHERWISE VL
VL if: X® X* and Y * Y* OTHERWISE IL
VL if: X® X* and Y® Y* OTHERWISE IL
IL if: X® X* and Y5 Y* OTHERWISE VL

Two important observations emerge from an examination of the
efficient simple rules shown in Table 2. First, simple rule 17 is efficient
because it holds the victim residually liable if X® X* and Y® Y*, but
simple rule 18 is also efficient because it holds the injurer residually
40. Under the assumption that persons act rationally and seek to minimize

private costs, a rule allowing one of the actors opportunity to escape liability by
taking the socially-optimal level of precaution provides an incentive for that actor to

do so. This leaves losses on the other actor as the bearer of residual liability.

Therefore the bearer of residual liability, also a rational actor, will take the sociallyoptimal level of precaution so as to minimize expected private costs. Thus, the rule
provides an incentive to both actors to take their socially-optimal levels of precaution

and total social cost is minimized. For a complete discussion, see id. at 359-60.

41. See id. at 359-60 (While not explicitly stating this test, the test is implied
by their discussion.). Some rules, for example rule 18 in Table 1, designate an actor
as the bearer of residual liability but also require that actor to take the socially-

optimal level of precaution as a condition of liability avoidance. Obviously, the
requirement is redundant in terms of providing an incentive for that actor to take
socially-optimal level of precaution, the actor cannot escape liability even if he takes
it since he is the bearer of residual liability. Thus, the bearer of residual liability is
provided an incentive to take the socially-optimal precaution whether or not he is
also provided this incentive by the test criterion of the rule.

1991:1]
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liable under the same test criteria. This anomaly can be remedied by
combining these two rules. A new combined rule is formulated as:
Either Liable if: X2>X* and Y_>Y*

We will call this new assignment of liability "public interest liability," ' 42 identify it as simple rule number 19 and, in Table 3, add it to
43
the list of efficient simple rules.

Second, under conditions of bilateral precaution, no efficient
simple rule remains in Table 2 for the test criteria X < X* and Y <

Y* since both rules 11 and 12 were inefficient." We can remedy this
second anomaly by holding both actors liable, perhaps on a propor-

tional basis, when both could have, but neither did, take the sociallyoptimal level of precaution, thus creating an incentive for each of
them to do so. This simple rule is formulated as:

Both Liable if: X < X* and Y < Y*
This assignment of liability has been called "comparative negli-

gence, ' ' 45 we identify it as simple rule number 20 and, in Table 3, add

it to the list of efficient simple rules under conditions of bilateral

precaution. Table 3 thus represents a complete list of efficient simple
rules under conditions of bilateral precaution. 46
42. We refer to this liability assignment as public interest liability since the rule
is efficient regardless of which actor is designated as the bearer of residual liability
since both actors are provided, by the test criterion, an incentive to escape liability
by taking socially-optimal precaution. The choice of which actor is residually liable
is often the product of other criteria, such as broader issues of public policy and
perceptions of the public interest. See infra notes 135-52 and accompanying text
(discussing, in the context of robust rules, such other criteria).
43. See infra notes 135-52 (discussing this new rule).
44. Rule 11 is is inefficient since the injurer is neither designated as the bearer
of residual liability nor required by the test criterion to take a socially-optimal level
of precaution. Therefore, the injurer is provided a positive incentive to take no
precaution since that will minimize the injurer's expected private costs. Thus, only
the victim is provided an incentive to take socially-optimal precaution under bilateral
conditions. Rule 12 is similarly inefficient except that the roles of victim and injurer
are reversed.
45. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 15, at 356-60; Daniel L. Rubinfeld, The
Efficiency of Comparative Negligence, 6 J. LEGAL. STUD. 375 (1987). A tort system
concerned with efficiency would be compelled to adopt such a rule when faced with
situations in which both actors failed to take socially-optimal precaution. See infra
notes 153-56 and accompanying text (discussing the adoption of comparative negligence).
46. These rules would be those considered by a tort system seeking economic
efficiency under bilateral conditions.
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TABLE 3
REVISED SET OF ECONOMICALLY EFFICIENT SIMPLE RULES
UNDER BILATERAL CONDITIONS
RULE #
LIABILITY ASSIGNMENT STA TEMENT
(5)
VL if: X>X* OTHERWISE IL
(10)
IL if: Y>Y* OTHERWISE VL
(14)
IL if: X < X* and Y>Y* OTHERWISE VL
(15)
VL if: X_>X* and Y < Y* OTHERWISE IL
(19)
Either Liable if: X _>
X* and Y> 'Y*
(20)
Both Liable if: X < X* and Y < Y*
B.

Rules Efficient Only Under Conditions of Unilateral Precaution

While a simple rule may be inefficient under conditions of
bilateral precaution, that same simple rule may be efficient when
considered exclusively under conditions of unilateral precaution. For
example, Rule 2 IL ALWAYS is inefficient under conditions of
bilateral precaution. 47 However, under unilateral conditions where
only the injurer can take the socially-optimal level of precaution (i.e.
X*>0) and the victim cannot (i.e. Y*=0), a rule that assigns the
injurer residual liability will provide an incentive for the injurer to
take such precaution to minimize expected private costs. In symbolic
notation, such an efficient rule would appear as:
IL ALWAYS (when X*>0
if: Y*=0)
We will call this rule "special strict liability, ' ' 48 identify it as simple
rule 21 and, in Table 4, add it to the efficient simple rules shown in

Table 3.49

Similarly, Rule 1, VL ALWAYS is inefficient under conditions
of bilateral precaution. 0 Nevertheless, under conditions where only

47. It is inefficient because a rule which always holds injurers liable will never,
under conditions of bilateral precaution, provide an incentive to victims to take
socially-optimal precaution.

48. We call this special strict liability so as to distinguish it from the academic
notion of strict liability: IL ALWAYS. See infra notes 82-97 and accompanying text
(discussing the use of special strict liability in the context of robust rules).
49. This rule represents a revision of Rule 2 in Table 1: IL ALWAYS. While
inefficient under conditions of bilateral precaution, it is efficient under conditions of
injurer unilateral precaution and would be adopted by a tort system concerned with
efficiency under those conditions. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 15, at 362-65.
50. The rule is inefficient because a rule which always holds victims liable will
never, under conditions of bilateral precaution, provide an incentive to injurers to

take socially-optimal precaution.
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the victim can take the socially-optimal level of precaution (i.e. Y*>0)
and the injurer cannot (i.e. X* = 0), a rule which assigns the victim
residual liability will provide an incentive for the victim to take such
precaution. In symbolic notation, such an efficient rule would appear
as:
VL ALWAYS (when X*=0 if: Y*>0)
We will call this efficient rule "special first party liability,"', identify
it as simple rule 22 and, in Table 4 add it to the efficient simple rules
in Table 3.52
The complete set of efficient simple rules, along with their
academic identifications," is summarized in Table 4*.4 All of these
simple rules with the exception of rule 19 have been considered in the
literature by analysts utilizing economic models."
51. The first party is always the victim. See infra notes 98 and accompanying
text (discussing the use of first party liability in the context of robust rules).
52. This rule is a revision of Rule 1 in Table 1: VL ALWAYS. This rule would
be adopted by a tort system concerned with efficiency under unilateral conditions
when the injurer can not take the socially-optimal level of care but the victim can.
See infra note 98 and accompanying text.
53. These labels originate with Brown, who was the first to name and describe
them using symbolic notation. See Brown, supra note 15, at 328-29. Brown's labels
are later adopted by Cooter and Ulen. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 15, at 35471. We find these labels confusing and even misleading. For example, Brown utilizes
the term "the negligence rule with contributory negligence." Cooter and Ulen later
utilize the term "negligence with a defense of contributory negligence." Further, the
rule, as formulated by Brown, is misleading because logically a rule of negligence
with a defense of contributory negligence completely barring a victim's recovery
should leave losses on the victim when both actors are negligent. Thus, a rule of
negligence with a defense of contributory negligence should appear as VL if: X <
X* and Y < Y* OTHERWISE IL. Brown however states the rule, recast in our
notation, as IL if: X < X* and Y>Y* OTHERWISE VL. The confusion arises
because Brown extracts the rule, through a process of elimination, from a statement
by Judge Shaw in Brown v. Kendall. See Brown, supra note 15, at 328. While this
confusion, in itself, may appear innocuous, its perniciousness evolves because Brown
is forced, by virtue of having to account for the rule's mirror-image test criteria, to
invent a new rule which he calls "strict liability with dual contributory negligence."
In part IV we will resolve this confusion by reformulating and re-labeling these simple
rules as robust rules. See infra Table 6, part IV(A). We adopt, in the interest of
simplicity and consistency, Cooter and Ulens' labels.
54. These rules are all efficient under the presumptions of the economic model.
However, only rules 19, 20, 21 and 22 are efficient in application. Rules 5, 10, 14
and 15 are inefficient in application. See discussion infra part III.
55. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 15, at 328-47. Brown focuses on these rules
because "[Tihere have appeared a number of important articles" in the recent
literature which have discussed them. Id. at 323. Our analysis, however, derives them
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TABLE 4
THE SET OF EFFICIENTSIMPLE RULES
UNDER ALL CONDITIONS
RULE #

LIABILITY ASSIGNMENT STATEMENT

Under conditions of unilateralprecaution
(21)
IL ALWAYS (when X* >0 if: Y* = 0)
(Special Strict Liability)
(22)
VL ALWAYS (when X* = 0 if: Y* >0)
(Special First Party or No Liability)
Under conditions of bilateralprecaution
(5)
VL if: X _ X* OTHERWISE IL
(Simple negligence)
(10)
IL if: Y _ Y* OTHERWISE VL
(Strict Liability with A Defense of Contributory
Negligence)
(14)
IL if: X < X* and Y _>
Y* OTHERWISE VL
(Negligence with a Defense of Contributory Negligence)
(15)
VL if: X>_X* and Y < Y* OTHERWISE IL
(Strict Liability with a Defense of Dual Contributory
Negligence)
(19)
Either Liable if: X _>
X* and Y _>
Y*
(Public Interest Liability)
(20)
Both Liable if: X < X* and Y < Y* (Comparative
Negligence)
III.

THE INEFFICIENCY OF SIMPLE RULES

The simple rules shown in Table 4 ostensibly represent "legal
rules" but, as legal rules, are incompletq. A complete, properly
formulated, legal rule is a statement constructed from at least two
simple rules. For example, the rule known as simple negligence, VL
if X >_X* OTHERWISE IL is a symbolic statement that holds the
victim liable if the injurer takes the socially-optimal level of precaution. However, this simple rule is incomplete as a legal rule because
it has an implied alternative which holds the injurer liable if the
injurer takes less than his socially-optimal level of precaution. Thus,
the complete statement of the legal rule of simple negligence must be:
independently by partitioning the accident space. This method leads to the discovery

of a new rule, "public interest liability" and an economic justification for the familiar
rule of comparative negligence.
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VL if: X_2X* OTHERWISE IL
ALTERNATIVELY
6
IL if: X < X* OTHERWISE VL1
While one may perceive the distinction between the simple rule
VL if: X >_X* OTHERWISE IL
and the legal rule
VL if: X2>X* OTHERWISE IL
ALTERNATIVELY
IL if: X < X* OTHERWISE VL
as merely cosmetic, the difference between the two statements is
significant. While the statement VL if: X > X* OTHERWISE IL is
efficient under bilateral precaution conditions using conventional
economic analysis, the complete statement which includes the implied
VL is not efficient because
alternative, IL if: X < X* OTHERWISE
7
the implied alternative is inefficient.1
The reason the simple rule of negligence, VL if: X > X* OTHERWISE IL, which holds victims liable if injurers take greater than
or equal to their optimal level of precaution is efficient in analysis is
because it provides an incentive for injurers to take socially-optimal
precaution to minimize their expected private costs by avoiding liability. 8 Similarly, under the assumption that injurers have avoided
liability by taking equal to or greater than their optimal level of
precaution, the rule provides an incentive for victims, as bearers of
residual liability, to take optimal precaution to minimize their total
expected costs.' 9
The simple rule's implied alternative, IL if: X < X* OTHERWISE VL, which holds injurers liable if they take less than socially56. Brown also recognizes this. See Brown, supra note 15, at 328 (discussing
"the negligence rule").
57. Compare Rule 5 in Table 1 with Rule 4 in Table 1. While Rule 5 is efficient,
Rule 4 is not, yet they are the same rule. Brown, while recognizing that a complete
rule consists of two simple statements, fails to subject the implied alternative
assignment statement to analysis. His reason is that the injurer is, by definition,
rational and will avoid liability by taking X_>X*. Thus, the condition X < X* is
never encountered, resulting in Brown overlooking the inefficiency of the implied
alternative. See id.
58. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 15, at 359-60. If given the opportunity
within the test criterion section (i.e. X>-X*) to avoid liability, under the assumption
that we are all rational beings, we will take the socially-optimal level of precaution
in order to do so.
59. See id. If you are the bearer of residual liability, (i.e. VL if:) you will
minimize your total cost by taking the socially-optimal level of precaution.
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optimal level of precaution is inefficient in analysis because, while it
provides an incentive for injurers, as bearers of residual liability, to
take optimal precaution, it does not provide an incentive for victims
since they are not required, as part of the test criterion, to do anything.

Thus, the complete rule is inefficient in analysis because, while it
provides an incentive for victims to take optimal precaution when
injurers have taken equal to or greater than their optimal precaution,

it provides victims an incentive to take no precaution, since no

precaution minimizes their expected costs, when injurers have not or
are perceived to have not taken optimal precaution.10
The complete rule then is inefficient in application under bilateral
precaution conditions where injurers have not or are perceived by
victims to have not taken optimal precaution, since no precaution
minimizes victims' total costs when they do not expect to be held
liable. Thus, the inefficiency of the complete rule in analysis mirrors
the inefficiency of the complete rule in application. A complete legal

rule must be efficient in application. In order to be efficient in
application, it must be constructed from at least two simple rules that
are efficient in analysis.
As a second example, the simple rule known as strict liability
with a defense of dual contributory negligence: 6' VL if: X _ X* and
Y < Y* OTHERWISE IL which holds victims liable if injurers take
60. Actors take levels of precaution other than socially-optimal precaution
because of "uncertainty." Cooter & Ulen identify "evidentiary uncertainty" which
leads to too much precaution. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 15, at 400-03. But
see Marcel Kahan, Causation and Incentives to Take Care Under the Negligence
Rule, 18 J. LEGAL. STUD. 427, 443 (1989) (demonstrating that "uncertainty always
causes injurers to exercise less than optimal care."); Calabrese & Hirshoff, supra
note 16, at 1058 (recognizing, within the context of the least cost avoider, "[tihat
there would be instances in which the victim who could avoid an accident more
cheaply than could the injurer would fail to do so, because he would know that the
injurer would nonetheless be held liable").
In order for victims to perceive injurers' failure to take optimal care, victims
must know their injurers. Victims often do know their injurers. Product attributes
are widely disseminated in lay literature such as Consumer Reports, advertising and
public testing laboratories (e.g. Underwriters Laboratories), television and radio news
programming (e.g. 60 Minutes) and comparison shopping. Two illustrative cases are
that of three-wheel ATVs and the Suzuki Samurai. Much media coverage attention
was devoted to these products' tendency to overturn.
61. "Strict liability with dual contributory negligence" is a term created by
Brown. See Brown, supra note 15, at 329. A similar term is later adopted by Cooter
& Ulen called "strict liability with a defense of dual contributory negligence." See
COOTER & ULEN, supra note 15, at 367. We find this label confusing. See supra note
53 (discussing the origin of this confusion).
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their socially-optimal level of precaution and victims do not is similarly
incomplete. This rule's implied alternatives hold injurers liable if both
the injurer and the victim fail to take their socially-optimal level of
precaution or both take their socially-optimal level of precaution or
the injurer fails to take the socially-optimal level of precaution and
the victim does. Thus, the complete rule of strict liability with a
defense of dual contributory negligence is given by the statement:
VL if: XX* and Y < Y* OTHERWISE IL
ALTERNATIVELY
ILif:X < X*ANDY < Y*
OR
X>X* AND Y>tY*
OR
X < X* AND Ya Y* OTHERWISE VL
While the simple rule is efficient under bilateral precaution conditions
using conventional economic analysis, one of its implied alternatives,
IL if: X < X* AND Y < Y*, is not.
The reason the simple rule of strict liability with a defense of
dual contributory negligence in which victims are liable if injurers
take greater than or equal to their socially-optimal precaution and
victims do not is efficient in analysis is because it provides an incentive
for injurers to take optimal precaution in order to avoid liability and
similarly provides an incentive for victims, as bearers of residual
liability, to take optimal precaution to minimize their total expected
costs. However, its implied alternative, IL if: X < X* AND Y <
Y*, which holds injurers liable if both the injurer and victim fail to
take their socially-optimal precaution, is inefficient both in analysis
and application because, while it provides an incentive for injurers as
the bearers of residual liability to take optimal precaution in order to
minimize their total expected costs, it provides a positive incentive for
victims to take no precaution when injurers have not or are perceived
to have not taken optimal precaution. 62
Analysts, concerning themselves only with the stated portion of
simple rules, have incorrectly identified them as efficient because they
have ignored consideration of their implied alternatives. 63 Analysts
62. This explains the rejection of a contributory negligence defense within the
context of negligence actions. See infra notes 153-56 and accompanying text (discussing the shift from contributory negligence to comparative negligence).
63. See Brown, supra note 15; CooER & ULEN, supra note 15. Analysts' failure
to consider simple rules' implied alternatives may be one of the prime reasons why
the debate in the literature has persisted. But see Shavell, supra note 17, at 22-23.
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employing the standard economic model have erred by failing to
recognize that when a simple rule is judged efficient, its implied
alternative may not be efficient. They have also failed to recognize
that an efficient simple rule whose implied alternative is inefficient in
analysis will be inefficient in application. In general, all the efficient
simple rules previously considered in the literature which are identified
in Table 2, are inefficient in application when the their implied
alternatives are considered. 64
IV.
A.

ROBUST RULES

THE DERIVATION OF ROBUST RULES

A tort system guided by principles of efficiency must adopt
"robust rules." '65 Robust rules take the form "P ALTERNATIVELY
Q." P is a simple rule and Q is its alternative. P and Q must both
be efficient and Q must be the mirror-image of P.6 Table 5 contains
the efficient simple rules shown in Table 4 67paired, when possible,
with their efficient mirror-image simple rules.

His argument concerning the efficiency of simple negligence, while concerned primarily with the relationship between efficiency and levels of activity, implies a
recognition that rules commonly thought efficient are not. But cf. generally Kahan,
supra note 60, at 437-41 (noting the inefficiency of simple negligence rules under
conditions of uncertainty); Calabrese & Hirshoff, supra note 16, at 1056-59 (providing
a complete discussion and examples of the inefficiency in application of simple rules
5, 10, 14 and 15).
64. A tort system concerned with efficiency would thus reject these simple
rules.
65. A "robust rule" is an explicit rule constructed from simple rules that are
all efficient in analysis and will thus be efficient in application.
66. The test criterion of P must define the levels of precaution the actors
named must take to escape liability. The alternative assignment of liability must be
made only when the actors named "fail" to meet those requirements. Thus, the test
criterion of the alternative assignment Q must be exactly the same as the initial
assignment in P except that the operands must be reversed indicating a "failure" of
the actors to take the level of precaution required of them. Simple rule Q then must
be the efficient mirror-image of efficient simple rule P. When this is the case, the
robust rule will be efficient in application and thus would be considered for adoption
by a tort system concerned with efficiency in application.
67. We have dropped the OTHERWISE specification from each individual
matched-pair of simple rules because it is redundant when two rules are viewed as a
mirror-image pair forming one complete legal rule.
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TABLE 5
EFFICIENT SIMPLE RULES PAIRED: WHERE POSSIBLE
Efficient mirror-imagepairs under unilateral conditions:
(22)
VL ALWAYS (when X* =0 if: Y*>0)
and
(21)
IL ALWAYS (when X* >0 if: Y* =0)
Efficient mirror-imagepairs under bilateralconditions:
(15)
VL if: X_>X* and Y < Y*
and
(14)
IL if: X < X* and Y__Y*
(19)
(20)

Either Liable if: X _ X* and Y >_Y*
and
Both Liable if: X < X* and Y < Y*

Efficient simple rules with no efficient mirror-image:
(5)
VL if: X>X*
IL if: Y_ Y*
(10)
It is interesting to note that efficient simple rules 10, IL if: Y > Y*
OTHERWISE VL, and 5, VL if: X 2_X* OTHERWISE IL are neither
mirror-images of each other nor do they have efficient mirror-images.68 The mirror-image of rule 10 is rule 7, VL if: Y < Y*
OTHERWISE IL. Rule 10 is efficient under conditions of bilateral
precaution because it provides an incentive for victims to take their
socially-optimal level of precaution in order to avoid liability and
similarly provides an incentive for injurers, as bearers of residual
liability, to take optimal precaution to minimize their total costs. Rule
7 however is inefficient under conditions of bilateral precaution
because it provides no incentive for injurers to take their sociallyoptimal level of care when they perceive that victims will not or did
not. 69 In application, strict liability with the defense of contributory
68. Brown has noted that the two rules have a symmetry in construction. See
Brown, supra note 15, at 323, 328. They are, in fact, not symmetrical. The operands
are the same but the test criteria are not. Note also that while he labels one rule a
"negligence" rule and the other a "strict liability" rule they are, in fact, negligence
rules because residual liability is assigned to an actor on the basis that the other actor

has not been negligent (i.e. XtX* or YY*).
69. It may be argued that, in the case of a new product, manufacturers have
no basis for the perception of what victims will or will not do with their product
once it hits the market. In fact, manufacturers know their victims quite well. Market
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negligence is inefficient when cast in the form P ALTERNATIVELY

Q.

Similarly, the mirror-image of rule 5, VL if: X>X*, is rule 4,
IL if: X < X* OTHERWISE VL. Rule 5 was shown to be efficient
under conditions of bilateral precaution.70 Rule 4, however, was
eliminated as inefficient under conditions of bilateral precaution. 71 In
application, simple negligence (i.e. VL if: X >X*) is inefficient when
cast in the form P ALTERNATIVELY Q, because its implied alternative (i.e. IL if: X < X*) fails to provide an incentive for victims
to take their socially-optimal level of precaution when they perceive
72
that injurers will not or did not.
The two simple rules of simple negligence and strict liability with
a defense of contributory negligence are inefficient when viewed as
rules in the form P ALTERNATIVELY Q. The two rules would thus
be rejected by a tort system concerned with economic efficiency. The
rules which are efficient in analysis when both assignments are considered and therefore efficient in application are the robust rules
shown in Table 6. These robust rules, not simple rules, would be
adopted by a tort system concerned with efficiency.
TABLE 6
THE ROBUST RULES OF AN EFFICIENT TORT SYSTEM
Rule 1 - Used under unilateralprecaution conditions:
STRICT LIABILITY IN TORT
IL ALWAYS (when X*>0 if: Y*=0)
ALTERNATIVELY
VL ALWAYS (when X*=0 if: Y*>0)
Rule 2 - Used under bilateralprecaution conditions when one actor
fails to take socially-optimalprecaution but the other actor does:
ORDINAR Y NEGLIGENCE
IL if: X < X* and Y>Y*
analysis, customer preference surveys, field testing, etc. often precede a product to
market. Similarly, some products, such as ATVs, motocross motorcycles, BMX bikes
and high-performance automobiles, necessarily involve exposure to risk and a manufacturer may have a basis for the intuition that victims are likely to misuse and
abuse their product.
70. See supra notes 56-60 and accompanying text.
71. Rule 4 provides no incentive to the victim to take socially-optimal precaution
because the victim is neither the bearer of residual liability nor required by the test

criterion to take such precaution.

72. See supra notes 56-60 and accompanying text (discussing the inefficiency
of the rule of simple negligence).
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ALTERNATIVELY
VLif:X>X*andY < Y*
Rule 3 - Used under bilateral precaution conditions when both actors
fail to take socially-optimal precaution or both actors do
MUTUAL CONDUCT LIABILITY
Either liable if: X>X* and Y_>Y*
ALTERNATIVELY
Both Liable if: X < X* and Y < Y*
Shavell, directly and simply isolates the problem with simple rules
and indirectly identifies why robust rules are necessary to achieve
efficiency. Although primarily concerned with levels of activity, he
recognizes that the problem of simple rules is in essence:
that for injurers to be induced to choose the correct level of
activity, they must bear all accident losses; and for victims to
choose the correct level of their activity, they also must bear
all accident losses. Yet it is in the nature of a liability rule
that both conditions cannot hold simultaneously . . .7
Simply stated, Shavell points out that the minimizing of accident costs
can only be achieved if both actors are each held liable for total costs.
This is an impossibility with simple rules. Robust rules, however,
provide incentives for both injurers and victims to minimize total cost
because they offer the "threat" that both injurers and victims may
bear all accident losses under each of the set of conditions. It is the
threat that each will bear the total cost that, in the robust rules,
provides the incentive not provided by the simple rules.
For example, an actor who fails to take socially-optimal precaution will be fully liable under unilateral conditions (e.g. Rule 1), fully
liable under bilateral conditions if the other actor took socially-optimal
precaution (e.g. Rule 2), or proportionately liable if the other actor
also failed to take socially-optimal precaution (e.g. Rule 3). However,
the other actor is similarly situated under the same conditions. Thus,
under the set of three robust rules, both actors bear the threat of
liability for total costs under all sets of conditions they may find
themselves and are provided a positive incentive to take sociallyoptimal precaution under all conditions regardless of, or how they
perceive, the other actor's level of precaution. A tort system seeking
efficiency must adopt robust rules.
73. Shavell, supra note 17, at 7.
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THE USE OF ROBUST RULES

Product claims may be predicated on one of three legal theories:

1) negligence, 7 4 2) breach of warranty,7 5 or 3) strict liability.7 6 The

primary difference between the three theories is that negligence focuses
on the conduct of the actors, while warranty and strict liability focus
on the characteristics or condition of the product. While a negligence
claim requires the plaintiff to allege and prove some specific act of
negligence, a strict liability claim contains no such requirement. Under
a strict liability theory, it is necessary instead for the plaintiff to
establish, prima facie, that the product was defective and that the
77
product's defect caused the injury which is the subject of the claim.
74. As part of its prima facie case, plaintiff's must prove that the defendant
failed to exercise due care and that this negligent conduct was a cause-in-fact of the
plaintiff's injury. The plaintiff is usually precluded from recovering from others in
the distributive chain if only the manufacturer has been negligent.
75. Breach of warranty is technically a contract action. See U.C.C. §§ 2-313
to -316 (1987). Breach of warranty requires no showing of fault on the part of the
defendant. There may exist a breach of express or implied warranty.
An express warranty arises when the seller makes an affirmation of fact or
promise to the buyer which relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of the
bargain. Some express warranties involve affirmative assurances of safety. See Baxter
v. Ford Motor Co., 12 P.2d 409 (Wash. 1932) (plaintiff injured by flying glass
recovered because defendant, in promotional literature, created an express warranty
of safety concerning the use of shatterproof glass), aff'd, 15 P.2d 1118 (Wash. 1932);
Lane v. C.A. Swanson & Sons, 278 P.2d 723 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1955) (plaintiff,
severely injured when bone lodged in his throat, recovered because defendant used
the term "Boned Chicken" on the label and, in advertising, used the words "no

bones".) The tort analog to express warranty is codified in
OF TORTS § 402B (1965).

RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

Implied warranties arise by operation of law, irrespective of the seller's intention.
Implied warranties include the warranties of merchantability and fitness for a
particular purpose. The implied warranty of merchantability establishes that the
product is warranted to be fit for its ordinary purpose, and in performing its ordinary
purpose, the product should not injure you (e.g. lawnmower starts up and throws a
blade, food poisons you, power drill electrocutes you). See generally William L.
Prosser, The Implied Warranty of Merchantable Quality, 27 MINN. L. REV. 117
(1943). The implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose provides that a
product must be suitable for a particular purpose where the seller is aware of the
purpose and the buyer relies on the seller's judgment. See generally Calvin W.
Corman, Implied Sales Warranty of Fitness for a Particular Purpose, 1958 Wis. L.
REV. 219. See also supra note I (identifying those jurisdictions rejecting 402A and
relying instead on breach of implied warranty).
76. Strict liability constitutes liability without requiring plaintiffs to prove fault
on the part of the defendant. See supra notes 1-25 and accompanying text (discussing
the shift from negligence to strict liability).
77. Although the methods by which the requirement is established differ, a
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In strict liability, a specific act of negligence is imputed to the
defendant without requiring the plaintiff, prima facie, to allege and
prove it.78 A product may be defective in manufacture, 79 in design, 0
or in the sufficiency of warnings accompanying it. s"
In order to demonstrate that our tort system has adopted efficient
rules, it is necessary to demonstrate that it has adopted the set of
robust rules shown in Table 6. Regardless of the theory pled, courts
employ the robust rules. The primary difference between the utilization of robust rules in the three varying theories is the meaning given
defect is generally established by a showing that the product was unreasonably
dangerous. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmts. g, i (1965). See also
supra notes 79-81, 107, 114 and accompanying text (discussing the varying methods
of establishing that a product is unreasonably dangerous).
78. In this sense, strict liability bears a striking similarity to the doctrine of
"res ipsa loquitur" in negligence claims. See infra notes 85, 86 and accompanying
text (discussing the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur and the application of robust rules).
79. This refers to situations where the product is not in the condition the
manufacturer intended at the time it left the manufacturer's control. Defectiveness is
usually determined through a comparison of seller's design or specifications with that
of the defective product and/or comparison with other units of the same product
line. See Curtiss v. Young Men's Christian Ass'n, 511 P.2d 991 (Wash. 1973).
80. This refers to situations in which the product is in the condition intended
by the manufacturer but was designed so as to create an inherent risk of harm when
put to its ordinary or foreseeable use. See Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng'g Co., 386
A.2d 816 (N.J. 1978).
81. Whether a particular warning is adequate is an issue to be resolved by the
fact finder, usually a jury. See MacDonald v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 475
N.E.2d 65, 71 (Mass. 1985). The factfinder may find a warning to be inadequate in
its factual content. See id. In MacDonald, the court declared that adequate factual
content must provide to consumers reasonable notice of the nature, gravity, and
likelihood of known or knowable side effects and to consult a medical doctor before
prolonged use. The product warned of blood clotting (a common cause of stroke)
but not of stroke as such, and the plaintiff recovered when permanently disabled by
a stroke. Id.; Billiar v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. 623 F.2d 240 (2nd Cir. 1980)
(label warning of "toxic and caustic components" inadequate to warn user of severe
facial burns). A warning may also be inadequate in its expression of the facts. See
Campos v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 485 A.2d. 305 (N.J. 1984). The court found
that a conspicuous warning in English was inadequate in its expression of the facts
because it was reasonably foreseeable that a large percentage of the unskilled and
semi-skilled workforce (who work with tire rim machines) do not read English and
that symbols should have been used. Id. A warning may also be inadequate in the
method or form in which it is conveyed. See Torsiello v. Whitehall Labs., Div. of
Home Products Corp, 398 A.2d. 132 (N.J. 1979). This court found that a manufacturer's warning to MDs of the danger of GI bleeding was inadequate in the method
by which it was conveyed becausethe manufacturer had a duty to warn of all specific
known risks in the package insert of over-the-counter drugs. A simple warning to
consult your MD if use is longer than 10 days is not enough. Id.
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to X*. In negligence, X* is a standard of care ascribed to "the
reasonable person," while under warranty and strict liability, X* is a
non-defective product.
1.

The Use of Rule 1

a. Manufacturing defects - Manufacturing defects always occur
under conditions of injurer unilateral precaution. As such, courts
always apply the upper portion of Robust Rule 1, (IL ALWAYS
(when X*>0 if: Y*=0).82 Only injurers have the ability to monitor
production and distribution (i.e. X*>0). Victims are without the

means, prior to an injury occurring, to affect manufacturing and

distribution processes, and there is no requirement that victims inspect
the product prior to use to discover defects nor guard against the
possibility that a defect may exist (i.e. Y* =0).83
A common class of manufacturing defect cases involve exploding
bottles.14 Under a negligence theory, courts invoke the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur 5 In strict liability and warranty claims, similar reasoning
to that of res ipsa loquitur applies.16 Regardless of the theory used,
courts, in manufacturing defect cases, employ the upper portion of
Robust Rule 1, IL ALWAYS (when X* > 0 if: Y* = 0).
82. See Thiele v. Chick, 631 S.W.2d 526 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982) (defendants held
liable when out-of-round load boomer caused a vehicle accident); Moslander v.
Dayton Tire & Rubber Co., 628 S.W.2d 899 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) (manufacturer
held liable when tire with bead too narrow to create adequate seal suddenly lost
pressure causing accident); Gottsdanker v. Cutter Labs., 6 Cal. Rptr. 320 (Cal. Dist.
Ct. App. 1960) (finding defendants liable under breach of implied warranty when
improperly processed live virus in polio vaccine caused plaintiff to contract polio).
83. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. n (1965) (rejecting the
defense of contributory negligence consisting of "a failure to discover the defect in
the product, or to guard against the possibility of its existence").
84. See Giant Food Inc. v. Washington Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 332 A.2d 1
(Md. 1975); Lee v. Crookston Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 188 N.W.2d 426 (Minn.
1971); Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944).
85. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328D (1965) (An inference of
defendant's negligence arises when "(a) the event is of a kind which ordinarily does
not occur in the absence of negligence; (b) other responsible causes, including the
conduct of the plaintiff and third persons, are sufficiently eliminated by the evidence;
and (c) the indicated negligence is within the scope of the defendant's duty to the
plaintiff."). Res ipsa loquitur indulges an inference that the defendant was exclusively
negligent and could have done more to prevent the accident (i.e. X*>0) while the
victim could not (i.e. Y* = 0).

86. In a strict liability claim, plaintiffs are excused from establishing a specific
defect, particularly in cases where the product is destroyed by the defect, if circumstantial evidence creates a reasonable inference that it is more likely than not that
the product was defective when it left the defendant's control.
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b. Design Defects - Some design defect cases occur under
unilateral precaution conditions. In such cases, Robust Rule 1 is used.
If occurring under injurer unilateral precaution conditions, courts use
the upper portion of Robust Rule 1. If occurring under victim
unilateral precaution conditions, courts use the lower portion.
The first class of design defect cases occurring under injurer
unilateral precaution conditions involve the "crashworthiness" doctrine. "Crashworthiness" is defined as "the protection that a passenger motor vehicle offers its passengers against personal injury or death
as a result of a motor vehicle accident.""7 Crashworthiness is concerned with a vehicle's ability to withstand the physical impact of a
collision as well as its capacity to minimize the additional or "enhanced" injuries the passengers may sustain as the result of the
"second collision" between the occupants and the interior of the
vehicle. Under the crashworthiness doctrine, the initial accident need
not have been caused by a defect in the car. Most courts considering
the issue have held that the manufacturer has a duty to design a
crashworthy vehicle.8 8 Crashworthiness principles have also been applied to airplanes, motorcycles and tractors.8 9
In crashworthiness cases, the injurer is solely in control of the
design features of the automobile which may mitigate or eliminate
secondary collisions (i.e. X* >0). Victims are essentially powerless to
affect the manufacturer's design choices or protect themselves from
injury (i.e. Y* = 0).90 Similarly, warnings are useless (i.e. Y* = 0).91
87. See Motor Vehicle Informatio& and Cost Savings Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1901
(14) (1988).
88. Crashworthiness was first recognized in Larsen v. General Motors Corp.,
391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968). Since then, the majority of courts to consider the issue
similarly have recognized the doctrine. See Hermann v. General Motors Corp., 720
F.2d 414 (5th Cir. 1983); Sours v. General Motors Corp., 717 F.2d 1511 (6th Cir.
1983); Hancock v. Paccar, Inc., 283 N.W.2d 25 (Neb. 1979); Roberts v. May, 583
P.2d 305 (Colo. Ct. App. 1978); Farmer v. International Harvester Co., 553 P.2d
1306 (Idaho 1976); Smith v. Ariens Co., 377 N.E.2d 954 (Mass. 1978); Huff v. White
Motor Corp., 565 F.2d 104 (7th Cir. 1977); Horn v. General Motors Corp., 551 P.2d
398 (Calif. 1976); Ford Motor Co. v. Evancho, 327 So. 2d 201 (Fla. 1976); McMullen
v. Volkswagen of America, 545 P.2d 117 (Or. 1976); Nanda v. Ford Motor Co., 509
F.2d 213 (7th Cir. 1974).
89. See McGee v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 147 Cal. Rptr. 694 (Cal. Ct. App.
1978); Bolm v. Triumph Corp., 305 N.E.2d 769 (N.Y. 1973); Empire Mach. Corp.
v. Industrial Cab Co., 504 P.2d 531 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1973).
90.. We exclude the rather indirect way consumer choice or preference of safer
vehicles may affect a manufacturer's design decisions.
91. It is an inherent incident to normal use of motor vehicles that some will be
involved in collisions and that some of these collisions will pose a serious risk to
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A second class of cases alleging design defects under conditions
of injurer unilateral precaution involve the use of state-of-the-art
evidence as a defense. The Restatement appears to accept a state-ofthe-art defense to product claims under strict liability. 92 In Beshada
v. Johns-Manville Products Corp.,93 the New Jersey Supreme Court

rejected the Restatement's view and held that manufacturers are
always liable for the injuries caused by their product(s) under conditions of injurer unilateral precaution. 94 The court concluded that

imposing liability on manufacturers for a failure to warn 95 was appro-

priate even in cases in which the manufacturer did not know of the
dangers. 96 The court advanced the rationale that an investment in
person and property. See Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 501-02 (8th
Cir. 1968). Warnings such as "do not crash" or " a crash may produce injuries
including collisions with the interior of the vehicle" will be useless since the victim,
even though heeding the warning, can do nothing in the midst of a collision to avoid
the injury.
92. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. j (1965) (denying strict
liability where the danger was not something the manufacturer could have guarded
against "by the application of reasonable developed human skill and foresight").
93. 447 A.2d 539 (N.J. 1982). In Beshada, a manufacturer of asbestos was
found liable for a failure to warn of the dangers of exposure to asbestos dust.
Plaintiffs included exposed workers or their survivors who had contracted asbestosis,
mesothelioma and other related illnesses. Id. at 542.
94. Specifically, the court found "that defendant's products were not reasonably safe because they did not have a warning [without which] users of the product
were unaware of its hazards and could not protect themselves from injury." Id. at
549. The court's justification was based on concepts of risk-spreading, accident
avoidance and fairness. See id. at 547-49. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 402A cmt. c (1965) "[Plublic policy demands that the burden of accidental injuries
caused by products intended for consumption be placed upon those who market
them, and be treated as a cost of production against which liability insurance can be
obtained." Id.
95. While liability was imposed on the manufacturer due to a failure to warn,
claims that asbestos was defectively designed were also alleged. The resolution of the
design defect case became unnecessary when the court assumed that the benefit of
asbestos outweighed its risk but concluded that asbestos' risk could have been reduced
to a greater extent by an adequate warning which would not have impaired the
product's utility.
96. A central factual dispute concerned whether Johns-Manville knew, at the
time of manufacture, the dangers of asbestos exposure. The resolution of this factual
issue was not necessary, Judge Pashman assumed the defendants' version of the facts
finding that "culpability is irrelevant," because "[s]trict liability focuses on the
product, not the fault of the manufacturer." Beshada, 447 A.2d at 546. The specific
legal question was whether a "state of the art" defense was available in a strict
liability product claim alleging a failure to warn. The court rejected this defense
finding that the fact that a product is "unsafe because of the state of technology
does not change the fact that [the product] was unsafe." Id.
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research could have and would have discovered the danger (i.e. X* >0)
so that a warning could have been provided to innocent victims
otherwise unable to protect themselves (i.e. Y*

=

0). 97

The rule an-

nounced in Beshada, in symbolic notation, is: IL ALWAYS (when:
X* >O if: Y*=0).
Some cases involving alleged design defects occur under conditions of victim unilateral precaution. These cases involve unavoidably
unsafe products where the danger is inherent when the product is put
to its ordinary use (e.g. sharp knives). On one hand, there is no way
for the injurer to employ a safer design without completely destroying
the product's ability to satisfy its ordinary purpose (i.e. X* = 0). On
the other hand, it is possible for the victim to guard against the
possibility and/or severity of an accident by taking precaution when
putting the product to its ordinary use (i.e. Y*>0). In such cases,
courts utilize the lower portion of Robust Rule 1, VL ALWAYS
9
(when X*=0 if: Y*>0). 8
c. Failure to Warn - Another class of cases occurring under
conditions of injurer unilateral precaution involve alleged failures to
warn. 99 In Laaperi v. Sears, Roebuck and Co.,' °° the court affirmed
the jury verdict against Sears under both negligence and implied
warranty theories, holding that injurers' standard of reasonable care
consists of warning of inherent non-obvious limitations of a product
and/or non-obvious circumstances in which a product will not function. The court affirmed the jury's conclusion that the injurers had
97. The court found that "[B]y imposing on manufacturers the costs of failure
to discover hazards, we create an incentive for them to invest more actively in safety
research." Id. at 548.
98. See Killeen v. Harmon Grain Prods., Inc., 413 N.E.2d 767 (Mass. App.
Ct. 1980) (cinnamon flavored toothpicks not unreasonably dangerous even when used
by a small child).
99. While failures to warn are generally considered to be separate claims than
those of design defects, for all practical purposes the determination of whether to
include a warning and the determination of the extent and content of the included
warning are design decisions. Many cases alleging a design defect also include claims
of a failure to warn. In these cases, if it is determined that the product's design did
not present an unreasonable danger to the eventual user, liability may still be imposed
on the injurer because of the failure of the injurer to include an adequate warning
to mitigate or eliminate inherent dangers in the product's use. See Beshada v. JohnsManville Prods. Corp., 447 A.2d 539 (N.J. 1982); Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods.
Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1088 (5th Cir. 1973).
100. 787 F.2d 726 (1st Cir. 1986). In Laaperi, plaintiffs brought suit against the
seller and the manufacturer, based on an alleged negligent failure to warn that an
AC-Powered smoke detector might not operate in the event of an electrical fire
caused by a short circuit.
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failed to meet their standard of care when they could have and should
have warned that a short circuit which causes an electrical fire may
also render the smoke detector useless in the very situation in which
it is expected to provide protection (i.e. X* >0).I l In this case, the
victims' had no standard of reasonable care as to the danger which
caused their injury in that the risk that "an electrical fire could
incapacitate an AC-powered smoke detector" is not obvious and thus
the victims could neither recognize nor take action to avoid the danger
(i.e. Y* = 0). 102
d. Conclusion - The rule of law utilized by the courts in cases
occurring under unilateral precaution conditions is not merely simple
rule 1 identifying the conditions under which injurers will be held
liable. Rather, it is a robust rule that holds injurers liable when only
they, and not victims, can take precaution (i.e. X*>0) because of
victims' inability to recognize and guard against the danger (i.e.
Y*=0) but, alternatively, holds victims liable if injurers could not
make an accident-proof product (i.e. X* = 0) if victims could have
avoided the accident by heeding an adequate warning and/or avoiding
a recognizable danger (i.e. Y* >0). In symbolic notation, the court's
rule of law within the context of a product liability claim occurring
under unilateral precaution conditions is Robust Rule 1 from Table
6.
IL ALWAYS (when X*>0 if: Y* =0)
ALTERNATIVELY
VL ALWAYS (when X*=0 if: Y*>0)

Strict liability theory typically conceived of as IL ALWAYS is a
myth. In application, strict liability is a robust rule which: 1) can
impose residual liability on either injurers or victims, and 2) is applied
only under conditions of unilateral precaution.' 03
101. Laaperi v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 787 F.2d 726, 730 (1st Cir. 1986).

Specifically, the court found that whether the defendant was negligent in failing to

warn is a question of fact for the jury. Id.

102. Id. at 731. The court found that "[w]here the risks

. . .

are discernible

...

the consumer is in just as good a position as the manufacturer to gauge the dangers
• . . and nothing is gained by shifting to the manufacturer the duty to warn." Id. at

730-31. Specifically, the court found that an issue of fact for the jury consisted of
whether "the risk that an electrical fire could incapacitate an AC-powered smoke
detector is so obvious that the average consumer would not benefit from a warning."
Id. at 731. The jury found that such a risk was not obvious and the First Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed the jury's conclusion. Id. at 732-33.
103. Courts have traditionally applied a strict liability theory under conditions
of bilateral precaution. We find that this is a case of mixing apples (strict liability
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The Use of Rule 2

a. Design Defects - Under conditions of bilateral precaution,
some sort of negligence is required to impose liability.1°4 While courts
have often applied the theory of strict liability in conditions of bilateral
precaution, they have been forced to address negligence principles to
do so. 05 This mixing of strict liability theory with negligence principles
occurs often in cases of alleged design defects.106
principles) with oranges (negligence principles). Under our analysis, strict liability
only exists under unilateral conditions. See Posner, supra note 15, at 165 (recognizing
that the "term strict liability is something of a misnomer . . . [under these circumstances] ... because in deciding whether a product is defective or unreasonably
dangerous . . . the courts often use a Hand formula [negligence] approach . . ").
See also Borel v. ,Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1088 (5th Cir.
1973) ("[A] seller is under a duty to warn of only those dangers that are reasonably
foreseeable. The requirement of foreseeability coincides with the standard of due
care in negligence cases in that a seller must exercise reasonable care and foresight
to discover a danger in his product and to warn users and consumers of that
danger."). Robust Rule 2 thus more accurately represents, in symbolic notation,
courts' misguided application of rules purporting to be strict liability under bilateral
precaution conditions.
104. Negligence, by definition, requires that an actor fails to meet a standard
of precaution (i.e. X < X* and/or Y < Y*), A negligence rule is therefore any rule,
logical (i.e. IL if: Y ? Y*) or illogical (i.e. VL if: Y 2 Y*), requiring, in the test
criterion, that an actor take an assigned level of precaution. See supra Table 1, part
II (identifying all simple rules). See also supra Table 2, part II (identifying only the
efficient simple rules).
105. Courts' failure to distinguish between conditions of unilateral and bilateral
precaution has, in our view, been responsible for the difficulty in distinguishing
negligence from strict liability. For example, under a unilateral precaution condition
contributory or comparative negligence principles, by definition, cannot apply. See
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS

§ 402A cmt. n (1965) (rejecting the defense of

contributory negligence consisting of "a failure to discover the defect in the product,
or to guard against the possibility of its existence" while adopting a defense of

assumption of risk). If contributory or comparative principles apply, a bilateral
precaution condition is presumed and strict liability cannot exist. Thus, when faced
with conditions of bilateral precaution, while courts have spoken of strict liability
with defenses of comparative negligence, those courts have actually been engaged in
a pure negligence analysis.
106. See Camacho v. Honda Motor Co., 741 P.2d 1240 (Colo. 1987). This court

notes that the use of consumer expectation test necessarily requires consideration of
"'reasonable' or 'unreasonable' standards [introducing] certain negligence concepts
into an area [strict liability] designed to be free from those concepts." Id. at 1245.
See also infra notes 106, 107, 114 (discussing the consumer expectation test); Suter
v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 406 A.2d 140 (N.J. 1979) (court notes that

risk/utility implicates the reasonableness of the manufacturer's conduct and thus
interjects negligence principles into a strict liability context). See generally Sheila L.
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Courts have endorsed two standards for determining whether a
product is defective in design defect cases under a strict liability
theory. The first standard is the consumer expectation test. 107 In
Morrison v. Grand Forks Housing Authority,0 one battery-powered
smoke detector, manufactured by Honeywell Corporation, was installed in the apartment. The smoke detector failed to activate because
Brenda Morrison had removed the battery. 0 9 In Morrison, in addition
to failure to warn claims,' 0 plaintiffs alleged that Honeywell committed a design defect by manufacturing a battery-operated smoke detector without an alternating current backup."' The court found that
"It]he battery-powered smoke detector performed adequately and
posed no unreasonable danger beyond the contemplation of the
ordinary user, or that of Brenda. Under these circumstances, we
conclude that reasonable persons could not find the detector to be
defective.""12
The Restatement's consumer expectation test requires a judgment
as to what constitutes the "ordinary consumer" possessing "ordinary
Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test for Design Defect: From Negligence [to Warranty]
to Strict Liability to Negligence, 33 VAND. L. REV. 593 (1980) (noting the mixing of
negligence principles into strict liability design defect cases).
107. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. i (1965). Comment i
states that in order for a product to be "unreasonably dangerous" and thus defective
"[t]he article sold must be dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be
contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics." Id. Other jurisdictions
have adopted the same or similar definitions. See, e.g., Nichols v. Union Underwear
Co., 602 S.W.2d 429, 432 (Ky. 1980) ("Some seventeen jurisdictions adhere to this
rule, eighteen have repudiated it, and sixteen, including Kentucky, have not addressed
the issue."); Riordan v. International Armament Corp., 477 N.E.2d 1293, 1298 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1985); Barnes v. Vega Indus., Inc., 676 P.2d 761, 763 (Kan. 1984) (trial
court did not err in giving jury instruction consistent with the comment i consumer
expectation test).
108. 436 N.W.2d 221 (N.D. 1989). In Morrison, plaintiffs were severely burned
in a fire and brought suit against Honeywell, the manufacturer of the smoke detector
installed in the apartment, under the theories of strict liability and negligence.
109. The fact that plaintiff removed the battery was uncontroverted, but there
was disagreement over whether she removed the battery because the detector made
chirping noises or to use in a small transistor radio. Morrison v. Grand Forks
Housing Auth., 436 N.W.2d 221, 223 (N.D. 1989).
110. For a complete discussion of Morrison's failure to warn claim, see infra
notes 129-34 and accompanying text.
111. See id.at 223.
112. Id. at 224. The North Dakota Supreme Court endorses the definition
provided by comment i § 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. See supra note
107 (defining the consumer expectation test).
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knowledge common to the community.""' 3 In such cases, consumers'
expectations establish injurers' standard of care (i.e. X*) and injurers
are liable if they design a product more dangerous than an ordinary
consumer would expect it to be when put to its ordinary use, assuming
victims do put the product to its ordinary use (i.e. IL if: X < X*
and Y> Y*). Similarly, victims are held liable if injurers design a
product no more dangerous than the hypothetical construct of the
ordinary consumer would expect and victims misuse, abuse or otherwise use the product in an unforeseeable manner (i.e. VL if: X_ X*
and Y < Y*).l1 4 Thus, in design defect cases employing the consumer
expectation test, Robust Rule 2 is utilized.
An alternative second standard also utilized in design defect cases
under a strict liability theory requires a risk/utility analysis." 5 A risk/
utility analysis asks the factfinder to decide whether the product's
usefulness outweighs its risk. 11 6 This alternative is particularly appro-

test).

113. See supra note 107 (articulating the Restatement's consumer expectation

114. It is important to recognize that "ordinary use" extends to foreseeable
misuse, and injurers standard of care involves anticipating some misuse. See Findlay
v. Copeland Lumber Co., 509 P.2d 28, 31 (Or. 1973) (defining misuse as "use or
handling so unusual that the average consumer could not reasonably expect the
product to be designed and manufactured to withstand it - a use which the seller,
therefore, need not anticipate and provide for"); Henkel v. R & S Bottling Co., 323
N.W.2d. 185, 191-92 (Ia. 1982) (The Iowa Supreme Court accepts the premise that
the manufacturer is held to foresee a certain amount of misuse and must bear in
mind the environment in which the product will be used in foreseeing such misuse.);
Venezia v. Miller Brewing Co., 626 F.2d 188 (1st Cir. 1980) (manufacturer need not
consider the fact that children might throw bottles against telephone poles and be
hurt if the bottles shatter). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. g
(1965). For more on misuse, see generally Aaron D. Twerski, The Many Faces of
Misuse: An Inquiry into the Emerging Doctrine of Comparative Causation, 29
MERCER L. Rv. 403 (1978); Dix W. Noel, Defective Products: Abnormal Use,
ContributoryNegligence, and Assumption of Risk, 25 VAND. L. REV. 93 (1972).
115. Risk/utility analysis was introduced in Wade, supra note 2 at 837-38.
Professor Wade identifies seven factors to be considered, including: 1) The usefulness
and desirability of the product; 2) The safety aspects of the product; 3) The availability
of a substitute product which would meet the same need and not be as unsafe; 4)
The manufacturer's ability to eliminate the unsafe character of the product without
impairing its usefulness or making it too expensive to maintain its utility; 5) The
user's ability to avoid the danger by the exercise of care in the use of the product;
6) The user's anticipated awareness of the dangers inherent in the product and their
avoidability, because of general public knowledge of the obvious condition of the
product, or of the existence of suitable warnings or instructions; and 7) The feasibility,
on the part of the manufacturer, of spreading the loss by setting the price of the
product or carrying liability insurance. Id.
116. While the specific factors considered differ from jurisdiction to jurisdiction,
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priate in cases in which the "ordinary consumer" likely would not

know what to expect." 7 While a risk/utility analysis ostensibly focuses
solely on the condition of the product, it necessarily implicates the
reasonableness of the injurer's conduct."' As such, strict liability
design defect cases employing a risk/utility analysis most often manifest the use of negligence principles and utilize Robust Rule 2.119

In risk/utility's simplest manifestation, if risk outweighs utility,

the product is unreasonably dangerous and liability is imposed on
injurers. If, on the other hand, utility outweighs risk, the product is
not unreasonably dangerous and liability is imposed on victims. This

simple manifestation presupposes a unilateral precaution condition in
which only injurers have a standard of due care to engage in a premanufacture and pre-marketing risk/utility evaluation. Unfortunately,
the world of legal application is not so simple and, in practice, a
number of bilateral case-law permutations exist in which risk/utility
is employed. Fortunately, all these permutations utilize Robust Rule

2.

First, there are cases in which the risk of a product outweighs its
utility (i.e. X < X*), no warning can diminish the risk to an acceptable
level and the product was put to its ordinary use (i.e. y _ y).120 Such
products are so dangerously defective that no alternative design nor

they are, for the most part, only slight variations of those identified by Professor
Wade. For example, in Chown v. USM Corp., 297 N.W.2d. 218 (Ia. 1980), the Iowa
Supreme Court adopted five factors including: 1) Gravity of the danger posed by
challenged design; 2) Likelihood that such danger would occur; 3) mechanical
feasibility of a safer alternative design; 4) Financial cost of an improved design; 5)
Adverse consequences to the product and the consumer that would result from an
alternative design. See also O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 463 A.2d 298 (N.J. 1983).
117. See Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Heath, 722 P.2d 410 (Colo. 1986). The
court found a consumer expectation standard particularly inappropriate in design
defect cases involving complex products in which safety is defined primarily by
recourse to technical or scientific information. Id. at 414, See also Chown v. USM
Corp., 297 N.W.2d. 218, 220 (Ia. 1980) (Iowa Supreme Court declared that either
risk/utility and/or consumer expectation test may be used); Suter v. San Angelo
Foundry & Mach. Co., 406 A.2d 140, 149 (N.J. 1979) (New Jersey Supreme Court
endorses dual standard in design defect cases); Barker v. Lull Eng. Co., 573 P.2d
443, 455-56 (Calif. 1978) (California Supreme Court provides for a dual standard in
design defect cases).
118. See Suter, 406 A.2d. at 171; Birnbaum, supra note 106, at 609-10.
119. It is important to note though, that risk/utility is also used in cases utilizing
Robust Rule 3. See infra notes 142, 143 and accompanying text (discussing risk/
-utility in the context of Robust Rule 3 application).
120. We assume that a warning counseling an individual not to use the product
at all is tantamount to no warning at all.
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clear, conspicuous nor strongly-worded warning would justify the
product's marketing.'2 1 In such cases, courts have utilized the upper
portion of Robust Rule 2, IL if: X < X* and YY*.
Second, there are cases in which utility outweighs risk, yet no
particular warning as to the danger causing the injury was required

because the danger was obvious and known to the victim. 2 2 On the
one hand, injurers have satisfied their socially-optimal level of precaution in marketing a product whose utility outweighs its risk (i.e.

X _X'*). Victims, on the other hand, have been injured because they
failed to satisfy their socially-optimal level of precaution when they

chose to encounter an obvious, known risk (i.e. Y < Y*). In such
cases, courts have utilized the lower portion of Robust Rule 2, VL if:

X>X* and Y < y,.*23
Third, there are cases in which utility outweighs risk but only if
risk is diminished to an acceptable level by an accompanying warning.
Under this scenario, both injurers and victims have levels of sociallyoptimal precaution. Injurers must determine probable and possible
side effects and provide adequate warnings as to both side effects and
proper use (i.e. X >_X*). Victims must heed the warnings and put the
product to its intended use (i.e. Ya Y*). 124
b. Failure to Warn - The mixing of strict liability theory with
negligence principles occurs as well in cases of alleged failures to
121. See Ruggeri v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 380 N.E.2d 445 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1978) (plaintiff died from burns when a highly flammable adhesive caught fire

and court found that defendant's duty was to manufacture products which are
"reasonably safe"); Drayton v. Jiffee Chem. Corp., 395 F. Supp. 1081 (N.D. Ohio
1975) (liquid drain cleaner containing sodium hydroxide was so dangerous to human
tissue that it should not have been marketed at all).
122. It is important to note these are not cases of unavoidably unsafe products,
the danger of which is obvious and inherent in the product's ordinary use (e.g. sharp
knives). Such cases occur under unilateral precaution conditions and thus utilize
Robust Rule 1. See supra note 98 (discussing unavoidably unsafe products with patent
and known dangers utilizing Robust Rule 1).
123. See infra notes 129-34 and accompanying text (discussing Morrison and the
encountering of a known or obvious danger).
124. See Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973)
(Court found that even if asbestos is a product whose utility outweighed its risk,
defendants possessed scientific knowledge of asbestos' danger and were liable for
failing to provide adequate warnings of the product's danger); David v. Wyeth Labs.,

Inc., 399 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1968) (despite the fact that a polio vaccine's utility

outweighs its risk, defendant was held liable for failing to warn of the statistical risk

that one person in a million would contract polio by taking the vaccine). For a
complete discussion of cases involving alleged failures to warn, see infra notes 99102, 129-34 and accompanying text.
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warn. 2"' 5 In the context of failure to warn claims, liability is imposed
upon manufacturers when they fail to give warnings reasonably
expected to be given under the circumstances. 126 Manufacturers are
not, however, obligated to warn of obvious dangers 2 7 and "a seller
is entitled to have his due warnings and instructions followed; and
when they are [not], he is not liable."' 28
In addition to alleging a design defect, in Morrison, plaintiffs'
also unsuccessfully alleged, under negligence 129 and strict liability, 3 0

125. See Torsiello v. Whitehall Labs., Div. of Home Prods. Corp., 398 A.2d
132, 137 n.2 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979) (The court noted: "We are satisfied
that where the 'defect' of a product is in the failure of an appropriate accompanying
warning as to use rather than in a design or manufacturing defect, the action is
equally sustainable under § 388 of the Restatement, Torts 2d and under § 402A.").
See, e.g., Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Yarrow, 408 F.2d 978, 992 (8th Cir. 1969) (prescription drug case, holding that the gist of the cause of action based on an inadequate
warning is the same under both § 388 and § 402A).
126. In Seibel v. Symons Corp., 221 N.W.2d 50, 54-55 (N.D. 1974) the North

Dakota Supreme Court found that "what is generally described as a duty to warn is
actually two duties: one is to give adequate instructions for safe use, and the other
is to give a warning as to dangers inherent in improper use." See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 388 (b) (1965) (A failure to warn amounts to negligence only
where the supplier of the good known to be dangerous for its intended use "has no
reason to believe that those for whose use the chattel is supplied will realize its
dangerous condition."). See also id. § 388 (c).
127. See id. § 388 cmt. k ("It is not necessary for the supplier to inform those
for whose use the chattel is supplied of a condition which a mere casual looking over
will disclose .

. . .");

Plante v. Hobart Corp., 771 F.2d 617 (1st Cir. 1985). In finding

unnecessary a warning that permitting a three-year-old child to ride on the running
board of a tractor risks injury, the court found that if manufacturers were required
to warn of every obvious danger inherent in a product's use, "[tihe list of obvious
practices warned against would be so long, it would fill a volume." Id. at 620
(quoting Kerr v. Koemm, 557 F. Supp. 283, 288 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1983)). See also Sherk
v. Daisy-Heddon, Div. of Victor Comptometer Corp., 450 A.2d 615 (Pa. 1982)
(finding unnecessary a warning that firing a BB gun at another person at close range
can injure or kill).
128. Morrison v. Grand Forks Housing Auth., 436 N.W.2d 221, 228 (N.D.
1989) (quoting Erickson v. Monarch Indus., 347 N.W.2d 99, 109 (Neb. 1984)). Cf
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. j (1965) ("Where warning is given,
the seller may reasonably assume that it will be read and heeded; and a product
bearing such a warning, which is safe for use if it is followed, is not in defective
condition, nor is it unreasonably dangerous.").
129. The court found that "[u]nder a negligence theory, the question is whether
or not the conduct of the manufacturer or seller in providing a certain warning with
its product, or in providing no warning at all, falls above or below the standard of
reasonable care." Id. at 224. In that the determination of the appropriate level of

1991:1l

ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY

that Honeywell failed to warn that a battery-powered smoke detector
would not operate without a battery'3 ' and also did not warn of the
32
In the context
danger of removing the battery and leaving it out.
of Honeywell's alleged failure to warn under a negligence theory, the
court utilized the lower portion of Robust Rule 2, VL if: X >_X* and
Y < *. The court stated that "the duty to warn does not attach
when the danger or potentiality of danger is obvious or is known to
the injured person."' 33 Thus, in the context of obvious and/or known
dangers, injurers have satisfied their standard of reasonable care by
providing no warning (i.e. X _>X*), and victims have a standard of
reasonable care to recognize and avoid the obvious danger, and when
they fall short of this standard (i.e. Y < Y*), they are liable.
reasonable care is central to the resolution of the legal issue, negligence actions utilize
Robust Rule 2 which takes account of both the injurer's' and victims' levels of care.
130. The court found that "[u]nder a strict liability theory, the question is
whether or not the warnings, if any, which accompany a product are adequate to
render the product not unreasonably dangerous to the ordinary user of it." Id.
131. Id. at 223. The court considered it "obviously dangerous for a consumer
to rely on a battery-powered smoke detector to alert one to a fire when the consumer
knows that the detector does not contain a battery." Id. at 226. The "obviousness"
requirement endorsed by the North Dakota Supreme Court and adopted in comment
n essentially adopts, in strict liability claims, the classic affirmative defense of
assumption of risk available in negligence claims. Assumption of risk in strict liability
requires a showing of more than contributory negligence in that the plaintiff must
have voluntarily and unreasonably proceeded to encounter a known danger. Such
knowledge must be actual subjective knowledge. Whether or not the plaintiff had
such actual knowledge is a question of fact for the jury and is "not precluded by
the conclusion that the danger should have been obvious." Camacho v. Honda
Motor Co., 741 P.2d 1240, 1245 n.6. (Colo. 1987). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 402A cmt. n ("If the user or consumer discovers the defect and is aware of
the danger, and nevertheless proceeds unreasonably to make use of the product and
is injured by it, he is barred from recovery."). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 496D cmt. c (endorsing, in negligence claims, a subjective standard for
assumption of risk while distinguishing the objective standard applied to contributory
negligence); Curtis v. General Motors Corp., 649 F.2d 808, 811 (10th Cir. 1981)
(purchaser of automobile with fiberglass roof made a conscious choice to forego
purchase of other automobile available with steel roof, the latter of which would
have provided greater safety); Hunt v. Harley-Davidson Motor Co., 248 S.E.2d 15
(Ga. Ct. App. 1978) (plaintiff was denied recovery when injured because of motorcycle's lack of crash bars because he had extensive experience riding motorcycles
both with and without crash bars, was aware of the purpose and the utility of crash
bars, inquired as to their availability at point of sale, but failed to require their
installation).
132. Morrison, 436 N.W.2d at 227.
133. Id. at 224.
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In the context of Honeywell's alleged failure to warn under strict
liability, the court again utilized Robust Rule 2. This rule finds injurers
liable when they fail to provide a warning as to non-obvious dangers
(i.e. X < X*) and victims heed the warnings given and avoid obvious
dangers (i.e. Y_ Y*). This rule alternatively holds victims liable when
the product cannot possibly be made entirely safe for all consumption
or use, but injurers adequately warn of non-obvious dangers (i.e.
X___X*), but nevertheless, the injury occurs because victims do not
heed the adequate warnings or because the potential danger is obvious
but victims fail to avoid it (i.e. Y < Y*).1a4
Therefore, under either a negligence or strict liability theory, the
law imposes a duty of reasonable care upon manufacturers to provide
adequate warnings and instructions (i.e. X_>X*) and a duty of
reasonable care on consumers to follow the warnings and instructions
given and to avoid accidents caused by obvious dangers (i.e. Y_>Y*).
Thus, injurers are liable when they did not meet their standard of
care to provide adequate warnings (i.e. X < X*) and victims did meet
their standard of care to follow adequate warnings and avoid obvious
dangers (i.e. Y_>Y*). Conversely, victims are liable if injurers met
their standard of care to provide adequate warnings (i.e. X _ X*) and
victims did not meet their standard of care to follow adequate
warnings and avoid obvious dangers (i.e. Y < Y*). In symbolic
notation, the rule used is Rule 2 of Table 6:

134. The North Dakota Supreme Court agreed with the opinion of the trial
court that "it was obvious and a matter of knowledge to Brenda that the battery
powered smoke detector would not operate without a battery, and because Brenda
Morrison had reason to know the detector was battery powered, the product was not
unreasonably dangerous because no outright warning was not given to this effect."
Morrison, 436 N.W.2d at 226-27. Under either negligence or strict liability theory,
other courts have held that a duty to warn does not exist as to obvious dangers. See
Fanning v. LeMay, 230 N.E.2d 182 (Ill. 1967); Fisher v. Johnson Milk Co., 174
N.W.2d 752 (Mich. 1970); Dempsey v. Virginia Dare Stores, 186 S.W.2d 217 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1945); Berry v. Eckhardt Porsche Audi, Inc., 578 P.2d 1195 (Okla. 1978).
See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. j (1965) ("[A] seller is not
required to warn with respect to products, .

.

. when the danger, or potentiality of

danger, is generally known and recognized."). But see Union Supply Co. v. Pust,
583 P.2d 276, 283-84 (Colo. 1978) (court ruled that a duty to warn may exist even
where the danger is patent if such a warning may reduce the risk of harm to the
user). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. i (1965) (discussing the
unreasonably dangerous requirement in relation to otherwise safe products possessing
an inherent risk of harm due to overuse or misuse); Id. § 402A cmt. k (discussing
products which are unavoidably unsafe even if properly used).
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IL if: X < X* and Y2>Y*
ALTERNATIVELY
VL if: X_2X* and Y < Y*
3.

The Use of Rule 3
Courts have adopted Robust Rule 3 in cases where, under con-

ditions of bilateral precaution, both parties have satisfied their level
of socially-optimal precaution or both parties have failed to satisfy

their level of socially-optimal precaution.' 35 The upper portion of the
rule, Either Liable if: X>-X* and Y>_Y*, has been adopted by courts
in a number of contexts. In such cases, since liability can be imposed
on either actor, the determination of which actor is liable is derived
from considerations of which outcome best satisfies the public interest
or is the best expression of public policy.
a. State-of-the-art - The first class of cases utilizing Robust

Rule 3 involve state-of-the-art evidence 36 as a defense in cases of
unknowable dangers. 37 In those jurisdictions permitting state-of-the135. See

RICHARD

A. EPSTEIN, A THEORY OF STRICT LIABILITY: TOWARD A
LAW (1980). Epstein wrestles with the moral and economic

REFORMULATION OF TORT

problems which exist in circumstances when both actors satisfy their duty of due care
concluding that the "decision that the conduct of both parties was 'proper' under
the circumstances does not necessarily decide the legal case; there could well be other
reasons why one party should be preferred to another." Id. at 11. After discussing
the famous case of Vincent v. Lake Erie Towing, he then continues concluding that
when a victim is injured, the injurer should be held liable even though the injurer
satisfied his duty of care. Id. at 14. Epstein thus endorses a rule purporting to be
strict liability even though it is applied in the context of a negligence. Within our
formulation, this is not a rule of strict liability but rather the rule IL if: X_!X* and
Y_>Y*, a subset of the upper half of Robust Rule 3 in Table 6: Either Liable if:
XX* and Y>Y*.

136. See O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 463 A.2d 298, 305 (N. J. 1983) (defining
state-of-the-art as referring to "the existing level of technological expertise and
scientific knowledge relevant to a particular industry at the time a product is
designed"). It is important not to confuse state-of-the-art within an industry with
custom within an industry. While an industry's customs may be relevant, they are
not identical with state-of-the-art. See Chown v. USM Corp., 297 N.W.2d. 218 (Ia.
1980) (Iowa Supreme Court distinguishes between "custom" and "state of the art").
"Custom" refers to what was being done in the industry, while "state of the art"
refers to what feasibly could have been done. Id. at 221.
137. It is important to distinguish cases involving unknowable dangers from
cases in which the dangers are known. These are not cases in which injurers improperly
assessed the likelihood and seriousness of a danger known to be inherent in a chosen
design nor are they cases in which victims do not properly recognize and avoid a
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art evidence, 38 the upper portion of Robust Rule 3 will be utilized.
In cases of unknowable dangers, state-of-the-art evidence establishes
that a risk was unknowable by the defendant at the time of manufacture and that the same risk was, by definition, unknowable to the
plaintiff at the time of the injury.3 9
In such cases, injurers and victims are similarly situated. Injurers
have satisfied their socially-optimal level of precaution in foreseeing
all the risks or dangers that technological expertise and scientific
knowledge make possible for them to foresee (i.e. X___X*), 40 while
victims have satisfied their socially-optimal level of precaution in
recognizing and avoiding all the risks or dangers discoverable through
the exercise of due care and the application of general knowledge (i.e.
y> y*). 41 Nevertheless, an injury has resulted from the unknowable
danger and a determination of which party will bear the costs of that
injury must be made.
Risk/utility considerations provide a public policy basis for making this economic determination. On the one hand, courts have
consistently denied victims recovery under strict liability when unexpected side effects are first caused by new drugs. 42 On the other
danger known to them or dangers which should have been known to them through
the application of information available within the general community. In cases of
those sorts of known and/or obvious dangers, Robust Rule 2 is utilized. See supra
notes 98, 106, 107, 114 and accompanying text (discussing such cases).
138. But cf. supra notes 93-97 and accompanying text (discussing Beshada's
foreclosure of the use of state-of-the-art as a defense in a design defect case).
139. If the danger or risk is unknowable to the manufacturer in possession of
technological and scientific information, it must be unknowable to the eventual user
or consumer possessing only the information known within the general community.
Similarly, the risk or danger could not be both obvious and unknowable since even
without specialized information, manufacturers are presumed to have recognized
obvious risks and dangers.
140. State-of-the-art considerations necessarily require recourse to a risk/utility
analysis. See supra notes 115-24, 142, 143 (discussing risk/utility analysis in various
contexts). Evidence of the state-of-the-art relates to both sides of the risk/utility
equation. Questions of what the manufacturer knew or should have known, given
the state of specialized knowledge, enter into assessments of risk likelihood and
seriousness, while questions of utility require considerations of safer alternative
designs and the public's need for the product. See supra notes 115, 116 and
accompanying text (articulating 'the factors employed in a risk/utility analysis).
141. State-of-the-art evidence thus implicates injurers' and victims' standards of
care or levels of socially-optimal precaution and, as such, necessitates recourse to
negligence principles. See Alan Calnan, Note, PerpetuatingNegligence Principles in
Strict ProductsLiability: The Use of State of the Art Concepts in Design Cases, 36
SYRACUSE L. REV. 797 (1985).
142. See Cochran v. Brooke, 409 P.2d 904 (Or. 1966) (no recovery when plaintiff
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hand, in cases other than drugs, courts have imposed liability on the
party in the best position to spread the loss.' A complete statement
of the rule in this risk/utility context is thus: Either Liable if:
XX* and Y>Y*.
b. Successor Liability - A second class of cases utilizing the
upper portion of Robust Rule 3 involve a successor corporation's
liability for injuries caused by products manufactured by their predecessor corporation. In Ray v. Alad, 1' the court, while conceding
that under the typical rule there were no grounds to impose liability
on the purchasing corporation, 145 nevertheless expanded the typical
rule creating a "product line" exception. '6 Other courts have declined
was blinded from arthritis treatment); Woodhill v. Parke-Davis & Co., 402 N.E.2d
1980). In such cases, utility outweighs risk and an adequate warning as to
194 (Ill.
all knowable side effects has been given by the injurer (i.e. X->X*) and the victim
has heeded the warning while putting the product to its intended use (i.e. YY*).
In this context, the rule utilized by the court was VL if: X->X* and Y_2Y*, a subset
of the upper half of Robust Rule 3 in Table 6: Either Liable if: X a X* and Y ->Y*.
The application of risk/utility in this context has been adopted in comment k of
§ 402A of the Restatement. In those jurisdictions adopting § 402A, it has been noted
that drugs, whether dangerous or not, "may be necessary to alleviate pain and
suffering or to sustain life," regardless of the unavoidable harm to some users. See
Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470, 478 (Cal. 1988). There was a finding for
the defendants because the costs of injury to the consuming public are outweighed
by the "broader public interest in the availability of drugs at an affordable price
[and] [p]ublic policy favors the development and marketing of beneficial new drugs,
even though some risks . . .might accompany their introduction." Id. at 478-79.

143. See Wade, supra note 2, at 838 (identifying the final factor in a risk/utility
evaluation as the feasibility for the manufacturer of spreading the loss by price
increase or liability insurance). In this context, the rule utilized will most often be IL
X>X* and Y_>Y*, a subset of the upper half of Robust Rule 3 in Table 6: Either
if:
Liable if: XaX* and Y>Y* since victims are rarely in a position to spread the loss
and injurers often are.
144. 560 P.2d 3 (Cal. 1977).
145. The typical formulation of the rule does not impose liability on a purchasing
corporation for torts caused by the selling corporation's products unless: 1) there is
an express or implied agreement of assumption, 2) the transaction amounts to a
consolidation or merger of the two corporations, 3) the purchasing corporation is a
mere continuation of the seller, or 4) the transfer of assets to the purchaser is for
the fraudulent purpose of escaping liability. See Ortiz v. South Bend Lathe, 120 Cal.
Rptr. 556, 558 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975); Schwartz v. McGraw-Edison Co., 92 Cal Rptr.
776 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971).
146. Ray, 560 P.2d at 8-11. The justifications for adopting such a "product
line" exception included: "(1) the virtual destruction of the plaintiff's remedies
against the original manufacturer caused by the successor's acquisition of the business,
(2) the successor's ability to assume the original manufacturer's risk-spreading rule,
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to adopt such a rule comparing the effect such a rule will have on
business transfers against the virtual destruction of the injured plaintiff's remedies against the original manufacturer. 147
c. Government Contractor Defense - A third class of cases
utilizing the upper portion of Robust Rule 3 involve a defense for
government contractors. In Boyle v. United Technologies Corp.,'148
the Court held that companies making military equipment may be
immune from suits in product liability "when (1) the United States
approved reasonably precise specifications; (2) the equipment conformed to those specifications; and (3) the supplier warned the United
States about the dangers in the use of the equipment that were known
to the supplier but not to the United States.' ' 49 The government
contractors defense displaces state law if "a 'significant conflict' exists
between an identifiable 'federal policy or interest and the operation
and (3) the fairness of requiring the successor to assume a responsibility for defective
products that was a burden necessarily attached to the original manufacturer's good
will being enjoyed by the successor in the continued operation of the business." Id.
at 9.
147. In DeLapp v. Xtraman, Inc., 417 N.W.2d. 219 (Ia. 1987), the Iowa Supreme
Court declined to follow Alad as to the "product line" exception noting that only
three other jurisdictions have followed Alad's lead and that successor liability: 1) is
inconsistent with elementary product liability principles and strict liability in particular
because it imposes liability without a corresponding duty; 2) threatens small successor
businesses with economic annihilation because of the difficulty in obtaining insurance
for defects in a predecessor's products; and 3) is essentially a radical change in the
principles of corporation law and, as such, should be left to legislative action. Id. at
221. See also Flaugler v. Cone Automatic Mach. Co., 507 N.E. 2d 331 (Ohio 1987).
148. 487 U.S. 500 (1988).
149. Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 512 (1988). The Court
also disapproved of the formulation adopted by the Eleventh Circuit in Shaw v.
Grumman Aerospace Corp., 778 F.2d 736, 746 (11th Cir. 1985), which emphasized
the non-participation or minimal participation of the contractor in the equipment's
design. Id. at 513. A fourth prong also exists to justify government contractor
immunity. The Federal Tort Claims Act exempts the United States from liability as
well as from indemnifying third parties for damages to a member of the armed forces
who is harmed during military service. See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135
(1950); Stencel Aero Eng'g Corp. v. Untied States, 431 U.S. 666 (1977). Other courts
have recognized the government contractor defense. See Bynum v. FMC Corp., 770
F.2d 556 (5th Cir. 1985); Tillet v. J.I. Case Co., 756 F.2d 591 (7th Cir. 1985);
Burgess v. Colorado Serum Co., 772 F.2d 844 (11th Cir. 1985); see also Brown v.
Caterpillar Tractor Co., 696 F.2d 246 (3d Cir. 1982); In re: "Agent Orange" Product
Liability Litigation, 534 F. Supp. 1046, 1055 (E.D.N.Y. 1982); J. Gordon Scannell

Jr., Note, The Government Contractor Defense: Should Manufacturer Discretion
Preclude its Availability?, 37 ME. L. REV. 187 (1985); Raymond A. Pelletier Jr.,
Note, Liability of a Manufacturerfor Products Defectively Designed by the Government, 23 B.C. L. REV. 1025 (1982).
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of state law." ' 50 In such cases, injurers have satisfied their level of
socially-optimal precaution by conforming to government specifications and warning the government of known dangers (i.e. X_>X*)

and victims similarly have satisfied their level of socially-optimal

precaution by putting the product to its ordinary, intended use (i.e.
Y>Y*). Thus, a rule of VL if: XX* and y

*,151

applies as to

designs because it is considered in the best public
government ordered
52
so.
do
interest to
• d. Comparative Negligence - Similarly, the lower portion of
Robust Rule 3 in Table 6, Both Liable if: X < X* and Y < Y*,
product
commonly known as "comparative negligence" is utilized in 54
5
Comliability.
strict
claims under both a negligence theory' " and
parative negligence, where adopted, completely displaces the commonlaw defense of contributory negligence. 5 In cases of comparative
150. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 507 (quoting Wallis v. Pan American Petroleum Corp.,

384 U.S. 63, 68 (1966)). In McKay v. Rockwell International Corp., 704 F.2d 444
(9th Cir. 1983), the Court of Appeals identified the state law displaced as that derived
from a state's application of 402A. Id. at 447. Thus, for the government and for
government contractors, Robust Rule 1 does not apply and Robust Rule 3 does as a
matter of sound public policy.
151. This rule is simply one form of Robust Rule 3; Either Liable if: X2_X*
and Y_>Y*.

152. The Court, in Boyle, found that "[t]he imposition of liability on Government contractors will directly affect the terms of Government contracts: either the
contractor will decline to manufacture the design specified by the Government, or it
will raise its price. Either way, the interests of the United States will be directly
affected." Boyle, 487 U.S. at 507.
153. In the United States, 40 states have utilized some form of comparative

negligence. See Tracy M. Blake, Comment, Comparative Negligence and Strict
Products Liability: Where Do We Stand? Where Do We Go?, 29 VML. L. REV. 695,

698 (1983-84).

154. "At present,

-

...

twenty-six states apply comparative principles to strict

liability either through judicial decision or by statute, while only three states expressly
refuse to make the application. In addition, eleven states apply comparative principles
to warranty actions, while no state has explicitly refused such an application." Id.
at 718-19 (citations omitted).
155. This displacement applies only in negligence claims. Contributory negligence
constituted an all-or-nothing defense in which even the slightest negligence on the
part of a plaintiff precluded that plaintiff's recovery. Comparative negligence is both
a legislatively enacted and judicially adopted alternative to the common-law defense
of contributory negligence. In claims under strict liability, a defense of contributory
negligence consisting of a plaintiff's failure to discover a defect in the product or to
guard against the possibility of a defect has never been permitted. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. n. (1965). It is important to note that the displaced
common-law defense of contributory negligence is in fact simple rule 11 from Table
1 VL if: X < X* and Y < Y* shown previously to be inefficient in both analysis
and application. See supra note 44.
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negligence, liability is apportioned on a percentage basis between
victim and injurer in cases where both injurer and victim have-failed
to take the socially-optimal level of precaution."16
e. Conclusion - Thus, Robust Rule 3 in Table 6 is applied in
product claims. In cases where both manufacturers and consumers
fail to take the socially-optimal level of precaution, both are held
liable on a percentage basis. In cases where both manufacturers and
consumers succeed in taking their socially-optimal level of precaution,
the rule applied is flexible so that either may be held liable based
upon other criteria. These other criteria often reflect judgments of
proper public policy and the public interest.'
V.

CONCLUSION

The rules of law applied in products liability cases have changed
significantly in the last thirty years. Many legal scholars have utilized
economic models to evaluate sets of simple rules to explain these
changes."' These scholars have, for the most part, derived and
examined simple rules which this article has shown to be inefficient
in application. "19
This article has expanded the economic model, deriving a set of
efficient robust rules.I 60 Such robust rules take the form P ALTERNATIVELY Q, where P and Q are mirror-images and both P and Q
are efficient when each is put to the test of the model. 161 Further,
through an examination of cases, we have demonstrated that courts
have utilized the set of robust rules. 62 Recognition of the existence
156. Numerous approaches to comparative negligence have been adopted including a pure form, a "less than" modified form, a "not greater than" modified form
and others. See Blake, supra note 153, at 699 (discussing the varying approaches). A
number of cases have merged product misuse into comparative fault. See, e.g.,
General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. 1977); Thibault v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 395 A.2d 843 (N.H. 1978); Busch v. Busch Constr. Inc., 262 N.W.2d
377, 393-94 (Minn. 1977); Butand v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 555
P.2d 42 (Alaska 1976).
157. Courts have often justified their policy choices by appeals to fairness but,
in so doing, they have, inadvertently, adopted rules which are economically efficient
as well. This recognition leaves one to ponder the question of whether that which is
fair is economically efficient or that which is economically efficient is fair.
158. See notes 14-18 and accompanying text.
159. See generally supra parts II, III.

160. See Table 6, part IV(A). See also generally supra notes 65-74 and accom-

panying text.

161. See generally supra notes 65-72 and accompanying text.
162. See generally supra notes 74-157 and accompanying text.

1991: 1]

ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY

and utilization of robust rules explains many anomalies heretofor
unsatisfactorily explained. Indeed, the light cast by the recognition of
robust rules, efficient in both analysis and application, more clearly
illuminates the significant changes in products liability law since the
1960s.
First, the judicial utilization of the set of robust rules explains
the abandonment of simple negligence in product claims under conditions of unilateral precaution. 163 Further, utilizing robust rules explains, under conditions of unilateral precaution, the doctrine of
"strict liability in tort." This doctrine holds manufacturers liable
when only they could have prevented the accident but did not, and
holds victims liable when only they could have prevented the accident
and did not. 1 4 This further explains the refusal to adopt strict liability
with a defense of contributory negligence. 65 The adoption of robust
rules thus effectively debunks the myth that the judiciary has adopted
the academic notion of strict liability: IL ALWAYS.' 66
Second, utilizing robust rules explains one of the great mysteries
of modern product liability law; the sudden abandonment of the
defense of contributory negligence in negligence suits and the adoption
67
of a comparative negligence rule instead.'
Lastly, the utilization of robust rules explains the seemingly
inconsistent shifting of liability back and forth between injurers and
victims in cases where both parties have satisfied their respective levels
of socially-optimal precaution. This shifting has created the appearance of a "capricious" judicial policy towards liability assignment.
We have demonstrated that it is not courts' whim and caprice, but
163. See generally supra note 1 and accompanying text.
164. See supra notes 47-55, 74-92 and accompanying text.
165. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §402A cmt. n (1965) (rejecting the
defense of contributory negligence consisting of "a failure to discover the defect in
the product, or to guard against the possibility of its existence" while adopting a
defense of assumption of risk); see also supra notes 104, 114, 131, 153-156, 165 and
accompanying text (discussing comparative negligence and the defense of assumption
of risk).
166. Plaintiffs only win approximately 60% of their products-related cases. See
Plaintiff's Win 60% of Personal Injury Suits, 6 LAW. ALERT 165 (1987). Indeed,
recent evidence suggests that "the courts have shifted markedly and now lean heavily
toward defendants in product-liability cases." Stephen Labaton, Product Liability's
'Quiet Revolution', N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 1989, at 26 col. 1; See also Theodore
Eisenberg & James A. Henderson Jr., The Quiet Revolution in Products Liability:
An Empirical Study of Legal Change, 37 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 479 (1990).
167. See supra notes 153-56 and accompanying text (discussing the shift from
contributory negligence to comparative negligence).
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rather their adoption of Robust Rule 3 which accounts for this judicial
shifting of liability. 68 Robust Rule 3 explains the liability of successor
corporations for tortious products manufactured by their predecessor, 169 and the development of a government specification defense for
contractors. 170 Indeed, the light cast by the recognition of robust rules,
efficient in both analysis and application, more clearly illuminates the
significant change in products liability law since the 1960s.

168. The adoption of Robust Rule 3 requires courts to engage in overt and
careful analyses and balancing of social and economic public policy.
169. See supra notes 144-47 and accompanying text.
170. See supra notes 148-52 and accompanying text.

